Death, Martyrdom and the Reconstruction of Social Identify.

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The JRC’s Conference Proceedings series represents a selection of papers presented at the annual Graduate Religion Students Association Interdisciplinary Conference, hosted by Concordia University, Montréal, QC.

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While martyrologies suggest that Christians constantly faced persecution at the hands of Roman rulers, evidence proves that literature does not represent actual Christian experiences. Specifically, the manner in which martyrs have been remembered does not reveal how Christians were “really” treated or executed. Though actually few in number, early Christians were able to transform their memory of executed Christians into a valorized “spirit” and theology of martyrdom by completely transforming the ancient notion of the noble death after the historical executions had already taken place. First, I will examine the attraction of the traditional and literal approaches to martyrdom. Second, I will challenge arguments that martyrdom was an ever-present danger for early Christians by arguing that persecution was sporadic, local, lacking legal structure and was largely determined by individual cases. Third, I will explore the manner in which the Christian community re-interpreted executions in an attempt to understand sporadic but intense persecutions. I suggest that such re-interpretation led to the construction of a memory of martyrdom which was ritualized. Fourth, I will evaluate how the “ritualization” of the constructed memory of self-sacrifice offered early Christians a new social identity. Finally, I will determine when a martyr becomes a martyr.

When faced with the memory of early Christian martyrs, one can be overcome by the courage and self-determination of the martyrs in the face of overwhelming Roman persecution. “Martyrologies are enthralling because they transport the reader into a world in which heroic victims, pitted against multiple forms of adversity, are always

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1 Versions of this paper were presented at the 16th annual Graduate Student Conference, “Crossroads and Borders: Negotiating Spaces, Identities, and Cultures,” on February 10, 2011 at Concordia University and at the “Spiral Graduate Student Conference on Religion,” on May 3, 2010 at the University of Calgary.
victors” (Heyman 2007, ix). When faced with this attraction, a scholar must ask himself/herself several difficult questions regarding the construction, maintenance and the intentions of these texts: Are they accurate descriptions of the deaths of early Christians? Who wrote martyrrologies? Why were these texts written? These enquiries directly question the authenticity, the nature and the intentions of martyrdom literature and are often interrelated.

HOW MANY CHRISTIANS FELL TO THE ROMAN PERSECUTION MACHINE?

Bowerstock argues that “suffering and death at the hands of persecuting magistrates so elevated the status and presumably future prospects of martyrs that, by the late second century, there were many Christians (though it is impossible to say just how many) who actively courted their own deaths as martyrs” (Bowerstock 1995, 2-3). Bowerstock’s examination of martyrs insinuates that numerous Christians engaged in voluntary martyrdom as well as suggests that martyrdom was an ever present danger for all early Christians. While this argument is easily acceptable if one naively takes early Christian martyrdom literature at face value, there is scholarly debate surrounding the extent to which early Christians were actually persecuted and executed.

“The traditional explanation for the emphasis on suffering in Christian texts has been that it reflected the desperate situation of a hounded community” (Perkins 1995, 15). Modern scholarship has examined martyrdom within its historical context and determined that the persecution of Christians was sporadic, irregular, random, local and experienced by few (De Ste. Croix 2006, 106, 121; Barnes 1968, 38; Perkins 1995, 15-16; Castelli 2004, 38; Bowerstock 1995, 25). Bowerstock, though never arguing that persecution was sporadic, concedes that “some emperors and some bureaucrats were more zealous in prosecuting Christians than others, and hence there was an irregular rhythm in the outbreaks of persecution” (Bowerstock 1995, 25). As such, despite the fact that martyrdom literature depicts Christians as being in constant danger, evidence suggests that the persecution of Christians, though a reality, was not intense or structured. Though persecution was a reality, the majority of Christians who did not openly parade their confession were not at risk of being tortured or executed by a Roman persecution machine (De Ste. Croix 1954, 104).

While the exact number of Christians that were executed for their beliefs between the middle of the first century until the fourth century C.E. is illusive, evidence indicates that a minority portion of a minority group was executed for their beliefs. In
other words, the fact that some Christians were executed is not debated while the number of executions and the fashion in which these executions were conducted is disputed. By questioning the nature of early Christian executions, I wish to question the representation of the executions and deaths of the martyrs. Specifically, I will examine and contrast the depiction or representation of persecutions and martyrdoms in early Christian texts with the historical realities of the executions of Christians.

EARLY CHRISTIAN “MARTYRDOM”

In his examination of Jewish and Christian “self-sacrifice”, Boyarin defines martyrdom as a “response to complex social, religious, and political pressures, and the date and the circumstances of its making are still the subject of a lively debate” (Boyarin 1999, 94). Though this statement appears to suggest that the act of martyrdom itself is a response to pressures (not unlike the stance offered by Bowerstock), I suggest that Boyarin’s statement refers to the “creation of martyrdom”. By examining the historical and social circumstances under which Christians were persecuted, it becomes possible to determine why early Christians interpreted the executions of members of their community as martyrdoms. Not only will this investigation provide revealing information regarding the relationship between the majority Roman population and the minority Christian community, but it will also provide crucial information about the self-perception of the minority Christian Church and their perception of outsiders. Specifically, an examination of the historical circumstances surrounding the murder of Christians will grant us the opportunity to determine whether early Christians chose death as a response to persecution or if those who survived a sporadic persecution chose to designate and remember those who had been executed as martyrs. Specifically, whether early Christians chose death as a response to persecution or if those who survived chose to remember those who had been executed as martyrs.

LACK OF LEGAL PROCEDURES

An examination of early Christian “martyrdom” literature reveals that there is an “absence of any clear legal foundation for what is happening” (Castelli 2004, 46). The authorities did not have a specific set of laws or legal foundation with which they could punish Christians and employed a flexible policy that Castelli characterizes as “live-and-let-live” (Castelli 2004, 46-47). This legal situation is exemplified in the response that Trajan provides Pliny regarding the treatment and punishment of Christians (Perkins 1995, 23). “These people must not be hunted out; if they are brought before you
and the charge against them is proved, they must be punished, but in the case of anyone who denies that he is a Christian, and makes it clear that he is not by offering prayers to our gods, he is to be pardoned as a result of his repentance however suspect his past conduct may be” (Pliny Epistula, 10.97). The circumstance, as depicted in Pliny, clearly demonstrates that while there were guidelines for dealing with Christians, there were no set laws. The issue of legalities is further complicated by the fact that Christians were treated as a “special” type of criminal. “Whereas all other criminals, once convicted, were punished for what they had done in the past, the Christian was punished for what he was in the present, and up to the last moment could gain pardon by apostasy” (Barnes 1968, 48). Barnes describes the treatment of foreign cults by Roman policy or law as ambiguous and changing (Barnes 1968, 50). This legal position (or lack thereof) towards Christians provided the local authorities with the opportunity to govern each circumstance individually. Despite this apparent freedom, it would seem that these authorities were heavily influenced by the crowds and sought to please the mobs (Castelli 2004, 45-46).

WHY ARE CHRISTIANS DISLIKABLE?

In his examination of the unpopularity of Christians in the Roman Empire, Dodds suggests that Christians were used as scapegoats and were disliked because they “did not behave like loyal citizens”, placed their God above the Roman state and religions, refused to serve in the army as well as belonged to a group with a divisive force (Dodds 1965, 111-115). De Ste. Croix argues that early Christians were charged with refusing to worship the Roman gods, not sacrificing to the gods on behalf of the emperor and not obeying the Roman authorities or magistrates (De Ste. Croix 2006, 112-124). The criticisms of these behaviours suggest that Christians were perceived as antisocial and rebellious (Salisbury 2004, 16-17).

Evidence suggests that false charges, including cannibalism and incest were raised against early Christians. Both Dodds and De Ste. Croix are quick to prove that such charges were constructed in order to portray Christians as immoral people, to inflame public opinion or represent a misunderstanding of Christian morals and politics (De Ste. Croix 2006, 128-129; Dodds 1965, 112). In his article, “These People are...Men Eaters: Banquets of the Anti-Associations and Perceptions of Minority Cultural Groups”, Harland describes the manner in which “the other” are defined. “Such stories of wild transgression in both fictional and historical narratives draw on ethnographic stereotypes of ‘the other’ in order to present a frightening picture of the dangerous or alien anti-association within society” (Harland 2007, 57). This inversion of common
social values includes “excessive and sub-human” behaviour that is depicted as “wild transgression[s]” (Harland 2007, 58-64). His article is valuable for understanding why early Christians were painted as dangerous individuals and why early Christians depicted non-believers as dangerous.

WHO CHOSE MARTYRDOM? OR WAS MARTYRDOM CHOSEN FOR YOU?

Some scholars examine early Christian martyrdom as an act that granted the executed an achievement because they preferred martyrdom than denying their faith. Martyrdom reinforced the notion that life on earth was temporary while the life obtained after death was dignified, glorious and permanent (Rossi 1984, 62). Christian confessor-martyrs believed that their choice to die transcended Roman culture as well as permitted them to die honourably, heroically and with a guarantee of salvation while exalting both God and themselves (Straw 2002, 39-57; van Henten and Avemarie 2002, 91-100). It was assumed during this period that those who had chosen to suffer where not “forced to die” because the act of death was chosen by the martyr (Straw 2002, 41). Droge and Tabor take this thesis a step further by arguing that Jesus was the proto-martyr figure (Droge and Tabor 1992, 126).

For some Christians, ‘following’ meant a vicarious re-enactment of Jesus’ death and resurrection through the ritual of baptism. But other Christians understood the idea of ‘following’ more literally. They believed that salvation could only be guaranteed by actually re-enacting the death of Jesus- that is, by voluntarily offering themselves up to death as he had done (Droge and Tabor 1992, 126).

Early Christian martyrdom, as described by these scholars, can be interpreted as a ritualized Christian response to Roman persecution. Glucklich argues that the “vicarious property of suffering stands at the center of Christian life, beginning with the sacrifice of Christ and running through the capacity to imitate the suffering Christ” (Glucklich 2001, 29).

Despite the fact that this ritualistic view of early Christian martyrdom is attractive to some early Christian scholars, an examination of martyrdom through a different lens will provide us with more answers about the creation of the ritual. It is important to remember that early Christian martyrdom literature was not written by the martyrs themselves but by individuals who sought to remember the individual who was executed. As such, I will now examine the execution of Christians through the lens of the survivors. Specifically, I will examine how the ritual of martyrdom was created after the martyrs had already been executed.
POST-EXECUTION “MARTYRDOM”

Though I express doubt in Droge and Tabor’s ability to prove that Jesus is a proto-martyr that others sought to imitate, they have successfully deconstructed Jesus’ martyrdom. “By the time we reach the Gospel accounts, written a generation or more after Jesus’ death, a transformation has occurred. Jesus’ death was not a mistake; his was not the execution of a failed prophet. On the contrary, it was precisely for this reason that Jesus came: to redeem the world from sin through his sacrificial death” (Droge and Tabor 1992, 115). This reconstructed and transformed memory allowed early Christians to make sense of Jesus’ death where his death was no longer a mistake but the overwhelming glorification and success of a hero (Droge and Tabor 1992, 117-119). In light of this reconstruction, Jesus’ “martyrdom” demonstrates that “the making of a martyr; a contested social process, depends on both the resources of the martyr’s supporters and the cultural context into which the martyr’s image is introduced” (DeSoucey et al. 2008, 99). Martyrdom, therefore, is not dependent upon the executed individual, but upon the community of believers. One does not need a martyr for a community to have a suffering martyr mentality.

THE COLLECTIVE MEMORY OF “MARTYRDOM”

Castelli argues that Christian martyrdoms should be examined in terms of an ongoing development of collective memory. “Various ideas coalesce around the facts of violence and the feelings of marginalization and oppression. These ideas, in turn, produce narratives, social formations, practices, and representations. In the process of making sense of fact and feeling, of generating a collectively livable story, culture is produced” (Castelli 2004, 33-34). It is the generation of culture that produces a memory of past suffering. Like Droge and Tabor, Castelli argues that the early Christian executions were reconstructed and provided a “new collective memory” where culture was produced. The persecution of a few Christians provided the community with an opportunity to re-interpret the deaths, provide execution with meaning, gain a distinct group identity and new collective memory as well as create the notion of a ritual of martyrdom where one did not previously exist (Castelli 2004, 34). As such, martyrdoms should be examined in terms of the memory of the martyr rather than in terms of a historical death. “Martyrdom can be understood as one form of refusing the meaningless of death itself, of insisting that suffering and death do not signify emptiness and nothingness” (Castelli 2004, 34). This “self-fulfilling prophecy” provided individuals with a paradigm to interpret later Christian executions as martyrdoms post-mortem.
(Castelli 2004, 35-36). Thus, early Christians were not martyrs when they were executed: they were awarded this title after their death.

“New Testament authors shaped a mythic framework for meaningful suffering and also developed the raw material of self-fulfilling prophecy in repeating predictions and persecutions to come” (Castelli 2004, 35). For example, the Gospel of Mark states “If any want to become my followers, let them deny themselves and take up their cross and follow me. For those who want to save their life will lose it, and those who lose their life for my sake, and for the sake of the gospel will save it” (Mark 8: 34-35). This infused construction of the memory of Jesus’ death provided a framework from which later Christians could theorize about, interpret and understand contemporary executions (Castelli 2004, 35-36; Perkins 1995, 3). While these texts would not have provided early Christians with a template to martyr themselves, they provided a framework to understand executions, understand their identity as a suffering community and acquire a sense of the “real” (Castelli 2004, 36; Perkins 1995, 4). Therefore, early Christian culture was produced through the re-understanding of executions in religious texts (Perkins 1995, 5). A manipulated representation of historical executions in early Christian texts came to provide the Christian community with a “better” understanding of their contemporary lives. It is not Jesus, other “martyrs” or Roman persecution that provided the Christian community with their identity; it is literary discourse that provided a united suffering paradigm (Perkins 1995, 5-9).

ENTREPRENEURS OF “MARTYRDOM”

The creation of the martyrdom paradigm and template of suffering suggests that the historical martyrdom of early Christians by Roman authorities was not actually a ritual practice. “Reputational entrepreneurs” used early Christian martyrdom literature to transform execution into martyrdom where deaths were provided with a significant religious memory. “It is the reputational entrepreneur, not the martyr, who transforms the bodily image into one powerful enough to break through the established social order” (DeSoucey et al. 2008, 100). A ritual of martyrdom, as has been traditionally understood, did not exist. However, this does not suggest that martyrrologies did not create the “reality” of a ritual.

Through the use of Joan of Arc (1412-1431), John Brown (1800-1859) and Ché Guevara (1926-1967), DeSoucey at al. illustrate how martyrs have been reprocessed beyond their deaths. They demonstrate how “different parties call upon the body to construct a reputation as a martyr and then leverage that reputation in support of specific interests” (DeSoucey et al. 2008, 103). By deconstructing the memory and
“martyrification” of Joan of Arc, John Brown and Ché Guevara, DeSoucey et al. prove that contemporary reputational entrepreneurs construct a past and comment on their present conditions (DeSoucey et al. 2008, 103). Essentially, this process transforms an ordinary death into a glorified experience that provides insight into a current issue.

Though DeSoucey at el. examine the manipulation and transformation of later martyrs, their research also provides great insight into early Christian “martyrdom”. Martyrdoms, as depicted in literature and collective memory, display common threads or conditions. “Martyr stories are marked by personal agency, violence to the body, institutional execution, and, often, final words or actions that articulate the martyr’s commitment to tightly held beliefs and identifications with a cause” (DeSoucey 2008, 101). These core components of martyrdom are readily available in numerous early Christian martyrdom texts including The Martyrdom of Polycarp as well as The Martyrdom of Saints Perpetua and Felicitas. Both Polycarp and Perpetua are depicted as faithful individuals who seek martyrdom as an agency to be reunited with God. During this “ritualized” process, the martyrs are placed on trial by the Romans, are beaten, mutilated and murdered all the while they proclaim the Christian message of salvation. “It is a willingness to die rather than to abandon those beliefs that generates the powerful images of physically upon which partisans draw in proclaiming and propagating the martyr’s (and their own beliefs)” (DeSoucey 2008, 101). Martyrologies were written so that they would not be forgotten. “The words they chose and the incidents they selected mattered more than the blood that was shed” (Salisbury 2004, 3). The memory of the “martyrs” was more important that their historical executions.

A NEW ARCHETYPE

In context of DeSoucey et al.’s research, it is clear that early Christians, while they were informed by models of noble death, sought to create a new archetype. Living in a society that accepted voluntary death as a means to reinstate honour, early Christians modified this acceptable practice to suit their contemporary needs. “While soldiers might die in battle or widows self-immolate on their husbands’ funeral pyres, their deaths result from the societies’ normative codes rather than being the result of a conscious choice by enemies” (DeSoucey et al. 2008, 101). Though new traditions are often “grafted on old ones”, the creation of martyrdom demonstrates that snippets of acceptable ritual practices can be infused with completely new moral and religious instructions (Hobsbawm 1992, 6; Heyman 2007, 202). “The success of Christian sacrificial discourse lay specifically in [the] way it was able to embrace and exploit the paradox of what others have called a ‘noble death’” (Heyman 2007, 166). Furthermore,
it is plausible that because “martyrdoms”, as depicted in early Christian literature, are recreations and complete transformations of executions that provide the dead individual with honour, that actual early Christian executions may have very little to do with honour or nobility.

**MOTIVATIONS BEHIND “MARTYRFICATION”**

As was previously suggested, the constitution of meaningfulness attributed to martyrdom provided the Christian community with an identity and self-understanding (Castelli 2004, 36). The generation of identity “through rhetorical strategies of differentiation and assertions of radical superiority intersected with the social and political realities implied by quite small numbers and significant social marginality” (Castelli 2004, 36). Guided by the paradigm presented in Castelli’s text, this paper will proceed to examine the creation of early Christian identity through the memory of martyrs.

“Reputational entrepreneurs invoke the body to substantiate a particular compilation of beliefs and, facing a potentially indifferent audience, use the body as tool to shake the established social order” (DeSoucey et al. 2008, 105). Authors frame the narrative with the goal of elevating the body to a sacred status: the body serves as a means to an end. The martyr is transformed “from an ordinary person into an extraordinary symbol of a social institution or cause [...] and creating revulsion towards the institutional executioners” (DeSoucey et al. 2008, 105-106). Thus, the reconstruction of the memory of a minority of Christians recreates an intensely valorized martyr, negotiates self-worth and establishes self-identity.

**TURNING THE PUNISHMENT ON ITS HEAD**

Though punishments varied in degree and nature, all punishments functioned as propaganda and re-inscribed Roman authority (Castelli 2004, 39). The punishment that one received depended not only upon the crime, but also upon one’s identity and social status. For example, individuals of high social status or citizens were granted rights that the poor or non-citizens were denied (Castelli 2004, 39-40).

Those of higher status could escape the more humiliating and cruel punishments-beatings and floggings, exposure to the beasts, crucifixion-while those of lowly free status and slave status could anticipate exceptionally painful punishments, condemnation to hard labor, and most likely an ignominious death (Castelli 2004, 39).
Castelli argues that the legal and social systems are highly interconnected and must be examined in unison if one wishes to understand the ritualized martyrdom experience. Remembering that martyrdom literature tells us more about the community that constructed the texts rather than the actual execution, we can conclude that the depiction of the arena, punishment, the Roman legal system and social categories achieved a rhetorical goal and provide us with information about how Christians identified themselves (Castelli 2004, 39). From their point of view, the re-definition of execution as martyrdom undermined the Roman value system and empowered their minority group (Castelli 2004, 39-41). Essentially, the “entrepreneurs of martyrdom” used the execution of a minority number within their group as an opportunity to negotiate their identity (Castelli 2004, 40). By ritualizing an event over which they had absolutely no control, martyrologies resisted Roman power and control: they transformed an execution into moral power (Heyman 2007, 168-200).

A “RETURN” TO “MARTYRS”: POLYCARP AS A TEST-CASE

The use of the word “martyr” to describe death as a result of a refusal to relinquish Christian beliefs only begins to appear in Christian literature after The Martyrdom of Polycarp (van Henten and Avemarie 2002, 2). After the arrest and execution of Polycarp, the terminology of martyrdom became associated with conviction and the preference to die a violent death as opposed to denying the Christian faith to appease the authorities (van Henten and Avemarie 2002, 3-5). The “martyr” is depicted as courageous and faithful: he refuses to acquiesce and faces death eagerly. However Polycarp is not the only individual who gains from his death. Others benefit from Polycarp’s execution because a template is established where all martyrs will be remembered for their bodily sacrifice (Pol. 2).

The description of the “martyrs” and non-believers in this document sets a dichotomous boundary where outsiders are categorized as cruel, unjust and evil (Castelli 2004, 45-49). The mobs are described as blood-thirsty and the world is described as unjust, lawless and immoral (Pol. 3, 13). “Early Christian sources, [...] obviously had an interest in portraying Roman authorities in ideologically charged ways. [...] Christian writers appropriated the fact of legal latitude and recast it in theological and cosmic terms” (Castelli 2004, 42). By defining the “outsiders”, the Christian community defined itself. The narrative form characterizes identity: Christians are depicted as perpetually innocent and courageous while outsiders are depicted as evil and lawless (Castelli 2004, 46-47).
INVERSION OF VALUES THROUGH RE-INTERPRETATION

Martyrologies provide a specialized paradigm from which executed Christians are to be remembered. As such, Christians who have been executed for being Christian, have no longer been executed, but have been “martyred”, have specific common characteristics and have followed a similar path to achieve their salvation. Early Christian martyrdom literature provided a new substantive meaning in a death (Castelli 2004, 34). Whereas an execution was simply a death, voluntary death for Christianity exemplified power and purity (Fields 2004, xvii). Persecution was transformed into martyrdom and submission was turned into a position of power.

Because the meaning of historic events is not permanent, these re-interpretations allowed for an inversion of Roman values where submission was valorized (Rosoux 2004, 101). The historical execution of Christians was ingeniously ritually transformed into self-sacrifice where the martyr no longer provided a sacrifice, but became the sacrifice while embracing and controlling his death (Castelli 2004, 51- 55). I suggest that martyrrologies represent a form of “sacred fiction” where the ritual aspects of martyrdom have been invented through theological, moral and didactic agendas of authors (Heyman 2007, 167). To die as a “martyr” meant that someone who did not experience the persecution first hand deemed it to be “noble” (Heyman 2007, 166). Martyrologies established themselves to “inculcate certain values and norms” despite their fictitious nature (Hobsbawm 1992, 1). The “invented” tradition of the ritual of martyrdom used the past to govern acceptable social practices and beliefs as well as provide group cohesion (Hobsbawm 1992, 4).

MARTYRS AS TOOLS

Rosoux’s examination of the relationship between politics and martyrdom reveals that the figure of the martyr serves as a useful tool which can inspire devotion, maintain an identity and encourage practices (Rosoux 2004, xxii-xxiii). “The concepts of ‘memory’ and ‘identity’ are mutually dependent and indissolubly linked: ‘memory makes us, we make memory’ [...]. Memory shapes (us) [...] and we [...] influence its content by our representations” (Rosoux 2004, 85). The creation of martyrdom memory by Christians impacted the manner in which Christians perceived themselves despite the fact that these identities were not created from objective truths. Rosoux describes communities based upon such creations as “imagined communities” (Rosoux 2004, 86). This does not suggest that the communities do not have a shared identity, but that “events are constantly being reshaped and reconstructed” (Rosoux 2004, 86). We can
thus define martyrdom as a reaction to present conditions rather than a proactive response against persecution (Rosoux 2004, 84).

A recreated hero narrative memory serves important functions. This reconstructed memory can encourage social cohesion, control the community, persuade people to maintain a belief and establish emotional security during periods of social instability or stress (Rosoux 2004, 87). “In this framework, the figure of martyr is revealed as particularly useful to maintain national identity, especially in a crisis situation” (Rosoux 2004, 87). Martyrs can inspire nationalism, group symbols and a united history (Hobsbawm 1992, 13). The invented ritual provided early Christians with a common identity of suffering as well as outlined the future sufferings of outsiders. Christian martyrdom was invented because there was a need for innovation: early Christians needed to define and understand themselves (Hobsbawm 1992, 8).

CONCLUSIONS

This paper has suggested that the origins of the concept of the martyr did not originate with the martyr himself/herself but was used by rhetoricians after the execution. “Martyrdom as sacrificial discourse was [...] the product of the philosopher and theologian” (Heyman 2007, 203). Martyrdom is a term that was employed to reinterpret the executions of those who had died at the hands of the Roman magistrates: martyrs became those who died for the Christian cause (Fields 2004, xvii). Therefore, martyrdom was not a choice made by the individual who was executed, but a result of political memory (Fields 2004, xviii).

The invented collective memory of a Christian martyr served various social purposes. First, the creation of the martyr provided the early Christian community with answers and security during periods of sporadic persecution. Second, the creation of the martyrdom ritual designed boundaries between Christians and non-believers: the narrative provided the early Christian community with an identity. Finally, martyrdom was used to maintain social cohesion. Despite the fact that martyrdom literature depicts martyrs as engaging in a God-willed ritual, the ritual of martyrdom is a creation which served social and political purposes. However, this does not mean that “martyrdom” is without ritual. The early Christian leaders who created martyrologies constructed rituals where they previously did not exist. The use of specific paradigms and intents indicates that those who created martyrologies did so in a ritualized fashion.
WORKS CITED


