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Psychoanalysis, Meaning, and Religion: An Essay on Loewald and Frankl

DEBORAH ROSENBERG

ABSTRACT

This paper will examine the work of two World War II-era psychoanalysts, Victor Frankl and Hans Loewald, both of whom attributed great significance to the experience of meaning, and who both showed an appreciation for religious meaning. These theorists drew on the horrors and revelations of WWII to better understand meaning, religion, and human life. Although neither presented a definitive concept of meaning that is generally accepted, their work demonstrates interesting attempts to combine scientific psychoanalytic views with an appreciation of meaning as a human phenomenon. Frankl described meaning as understanding one’s life to be oriented by purposes or goals, which enable conscious behaviour towards ultimate fulfillment. Loewald, on the other hand, believed that meaning was a subtle but ever present state of mind, which invested day-to-day life with significance and wonder. The present paper will contrast these viewpoints and discuss them, focusing on how they differ, how they complement one another and, finally, how each has strengths and weaknesses in seeking to illuminate the difficult notions of meaning and fulfillment in human experience.

Key Words: Victor Frankl, Hans Loewald, psychoanalysis, religious meaning.

INTRODUCTION

The issue of meaning has always been controversial in psychoanalysis. Freud’s psychoanalytic method, utterly reliant on a medical model of “objective science,” did not attribute legitimacy to ideas linking meaning and religion:

Scientific knowledge has taught [humans] much since the days of the Deluge, and it will increase their power still further. And, as for the great necessities of Fate, against which there is no help, they will learn to endure them with resignation...By withdrawing their expectations from the other world and concentrating all their liberated energies into their life on earth, they will probably succeed in achieving a state of things in which life will become tolerable for everyone and civilization no longer oppressive to anyone. Then, with one of our fellow-unbelievers, they will be able to say without regret: We leave Heaven
to the angels and the sparrows.’ (Freud 1961, 50)

Though Freud thought of religious belief as an illusion and a regression to infantile notions, neither his views of religion, nor those of many later psychoanalysts, could account for the need for meaning, often understood in religious terms, which many people experience in their lives (Loewald 1978, 58). Neither could it account for the passion inspired by such a sense of meaning which drives many people’s acts and thoughts.

Though perspectives on the concept of meaning are widely divergent, in the study of religion, meaning has proven to be central and enduring. As fertile ground for hypotheses about the human life and mind, the role of meaning in religious studies cannot be overstated. It has often been taken up as crucial and complex. For instance, in *Man’s Search for Meaning*, Frankl expresses the poverty of the explanatory power of reductive theories of meaning and religion:

> There are some authors who contend that meanings and values are “nothing but defense mechanisms, reaction formations and sublimations.” But as for myself, I would not be willing to live merely for the sake of my “defense mechanisms,” nor would I be ready to die merely for the sake of my “reaction formations.” Man, however, is able to live and die for the sake of his ideals and values! (Frankl 1984, 105)

In contrast to Freud’s position on religion, Frankl clearly perceived religious ideas and commitments as one avenue for instilling profound meaning into the lives of countless people. Such, he observed, was often the case in WWII prisoner camps, where a deeply sustained sense of meaning was often the only way to counteract the depravity and hopelessness of life. At times, religious meaning became a singular deterrent against despair in the face of seemingly inevitable death.

Long before WWII, however, certain influential psychoanalysts and psychologists had already begun to recognize the significance of meaning and religion throughout life, and chose to explore them as essential psychological phenomena. Notable among these early psychologists was William James. In the *Varieties of Religious Experience*, he offered an elegant description of the concept of meaning as it is manifested in a religious framework:

> If religion is to mean anything definite for us, it seems to me that we ought to take it as meaning this added dimension of emotion, this enthusiastic temper of espousal, in regions where morality strictly so called can at best but bow its head and acquiesce. It ought to mean nothing short of this new reach of freedom for us, with the struggle over, the keynote of the universe sounding in our ears, and everlasting possession spread before our eyes. (1902, 50)
James sought to explore the concept of religious meaning as an essential aspect of the human psyche. He understood religious experiences to be more than the product of short-circuited neuronal connections, as advocates of the medical-model of abnormal psychology suggested at the time (1902, 21). He perceived religion and the sense of meaning in life to be inextricably woven together, orienting individuals through the joys and sorrows of their lives. For James, these concepts offered an explanatory framework and a respite from hopelessness, empowering the believer throughout life:

The lustre of the present hour is always borrowed from the background of possibilities it goes with. Let our common experiences be enveloped in an eternal moral order; let our suffering have an immortal significance; let Heaven smile upon the earth, and deities pay their visits; let faith and hope be the atmosphere which man breathes in;—and his days pass by with zest; they stir with prospects, they thrill with remoter values. Place around them on the contrary the curdling cold and gloom and absence of all permanent meaning which for pure naturalism and the popular science evolutionism of our time are all that is visible ultimately, and the thrill stops short, or turns rather to an anxious trembling. (James 1902, 133)

James’ views on religion and meaning set the stage for those psychoanalysts who, after the violence and despair of WWII, were no longer satisfied with the classic view of meaning and religion as illusions and primitive psychic accidents. They understood that, for many people, religion and meaning are central aspects of self-identity and an adherent’s understanding of the world. These theorists strove to understand the complex and crucial role played by religion and meaning in all categories of experience: in desperate and demeaning circumstances, as well as in mundane life.

In their writings, both Frankl and Loewald consider meaning to be an essential element in human life and a precursor for psychological health. However, Frankl and Loewald’s perspectives on meaning diverge in many significant ways. Loewald considered personal meaning to largely be an unconscious psychological product of the infant’s initial unity with the mother in the earliest phases of life, interacting with later rational processes. Meaning results from this interplay between conscious and unconscious processes, manifesting as the sense of the oceanic, a sense of connection and timelessness that cannot be otherwise defined and which is often expressed as religious sentiment (1978, 60). According to Loewald, experiences characterized by these qualities are universal and healthy if balanced by generally rational interaction with the outside world. Any imbalance, even in the form of excessive rationality, can be problematic: “We know madness that is the madness of unbridled rationality” (56).
In contrast, Frankl considered meaning the primary motivational factor, animating people throughout their lives. Personal meaning, as Frankl conceived of it, is freely chosen, taking the shape of whatever the individual needs or seeks at any given point. Frankl’s theory suggested that a meaningful goal leads to disequilibrium, or a sense of tension, wherein individuals have identified some goal that they lack and strive for, and their motivation to accomplish that goal is maintained through the sense that they now have meaning in their lives, some externally-focused ambition. In Frankl’s view, personal meaning is defined by these external goals, and the meaning that is then attributed to them makes the work leading to their accomplishment fulfilling. Happiness and fulfillment require that one constantly be working, motivated by the sense of meaning, towards one such freely chosen external goal (1984, 103-116).

Now I will examine Loewald’s theory of meaning, as presented in *Psychoanalysis and the History of the Individual* (1978), in greater detail. Loewald’s take on meaning and religion stemmed largely from his view of *unconscious mentation*. He suggested that from birth, the unconscious sets the stage for the establishment of meaning in human life. He theorized that mentation is composed primarily of two ongoing and interacting modes, which he called primary and secondary processes. According to Loewald, primary process is the original mental state at birth, wherein the infant has not yet developed the capacity to make distinctions between various categories of sensations (15). Furthermore, the infant has no understanding of the distinction between itself and the primary caregiver, nor does it possess any concept of time (63).

In this undifferentiated state of being, the infant exists in complete unity with the world of its first experiences. Physical and interpersonal barriers have yet to be established. This state, which characterizes the earliest experiences of the infant, persists throughout life as “past history, understood here not so much in the sense of past ‘objective’ events or mental ‘contents,’ but more specifically in the sense of an earlier, archaic, form or level of mentation, that characterizes early developmental stages but is operative as well at chronologically later stages” (Loewald, 12). Essentially, Loewald suggested that primary process continues to function throughout life, manifesting itself in art, philosophy, and literature. In the adult, for instance, it consists of a manner of perceiving the world, whereby one experiences profound unity with others or the sense of being outside of time.

For Loewald, secondary process is a lifelong process of differentiation—
the formation of “oneself” in distinction to “the outside world.” This process, necessary to ensure successful functioning within the external world, replaces the primacy of the original unity with that of the distinctive self. According to Loewald, the process is born from the relationship with the primary caregiver. Seeing the infant as more than he or she literally is, the caregiver treats the infant as the person that he or she has the potential to become, thereby building the foundation for secondary process in the psyche of the infant. As Loewald explained:

The recognizing-caring activities of the primary caretakers crucially contribute to the development of the child’s psychic life by the fact of their being ahead of his present stage of organization. Parental caring, knowing, understanding, embedded in their interactions with the child, take place in the context and perspective of the child’s overall requirements and future course of development. Psychoanalysts have spoken of the mother, in the primordial infant-mother psychic unit, as a living mirror in which the infant gradually begins to recognize, to know himself, by being recognized by the mother...Her knowing and understanding the child, as well as the imperfections and deficiencies of her understanding, are embedded in these interactions. (Loewald 1978, 13-14)

By internalizing the recognition of the primary caregiver, the infant begins to form a self-identity. In secondary process, the infant comes to understand that others do not experience things exactly as she or he does. The original state of complete unity is reinterpreted by the infant, newly understood as a relationship between individuals. Simultaneously, the infant begins to develop notions of past, present, and future (24).

This form of mentation is transformative. It changes the way the infant interprets new information, and as he or she grows, secondary process mentation colors all experiences, both internal and external. The infant begins to form categories into which encountered external objects fall, developing schemas that limit and define future interpretations of experience. The infant builds narratives that justify internal emotional states, coupling them with external events, and these influence the formation of memories for life events. It is clear that the role of secondary process is imperative, laying the foundations of rational thought and weaving events and experiences into a coherent narrative distinct to “the self,” the point of reference for navigating life within the world. It is secondary process that facilitates adaptive functioning within the outside world, one characterized by infinite possibilities and minute variations that give each and every interaction a distinct quality:

What I call my unconscious memories and impulses are potentially mine to the extent to which they may be raised to a new level of mentation, may become
However, Loewald asserted that the infant does not simply begin in primary process and grow into “higher level” secondary processing. Rather than perceiving them as stages, he envisioned the processes as concurrent throughout life. Though primary precedes secondary, it is never outgrown. In fact, the interplay between the processes is what gives richness to experience. As Loewald explained:

It is the interplay between unconscious and consciousness, between past and present, between the intense density of undifferentiated, inarticulate experience and the lucidity of conscious articulate experience, that gives meaning to our life. Without such meaning-giving play we would have no future of our own. (Loewald 1978, 50)

Loewald made the marked observation that the tendency to understand mental development as a stage-wise progression through primary process toward secondary process could not possibly explain the source and function of meaning as a defining feature of human life over thousands of years. He emphasized that Freud himself had difficulty accounting for the significance of meaning and religion in his theory, which was characterized by a view of development as a linear progression away from fantasy and unity with the primary caregiver toward concrete individualism and even alienation from others (1978, 58). Conversely, the role of the interplay between primary process and secondary process throughout life was essential to Loewald’s view of personal meaning.

In his Comments on Religious Experience, Loewald suggested that the senses of timelessness, eternity, and spiritual connection with other living things stems from the overflow of primary process mentation into the rational continuity of secondary process mentation (64-65). The sense of a meaning in human life and the sense of spiritual connection are reminiscent of the original unity with the mother, wherein there were no two individuals but a single being. The sense of religious meaning, therefore, finds its origin within this alternative manner of perceiving the world—undifferentiated and boundary-free, described by Loewald as “oceanic” and “eternal”—but it is consciously experienced through the interplay between primary and secondary processes:

I believe that some aspects of religious experience are related to unconscious mental processes. Other aspects of religious life and thought can be approached by interpreting them in terms of the emergent dialectic between unconscious and conscient mentation, roughly speaking, between the irrational and the
rational...The range and richness of human life is directly proportional to the mutual responsiveness between these various mental phases and levels (primary and secondary process). While the latter is a later development, it limits and impoverishes the perspective, understanding and range of human action, feeling, and thought, unless it is brought back into coordination and communication with those modes of experience that remain their living source, and perhaps their ultimate destination. (Loewald 1978, 61)

I turn now to an examination of Victor Frankl, who, in his discussion of meaning and its role in human life, painted a very different picture than Loewald. To Frankl, meaning signified “becoming aware of a possibility against the background of reality or becoming aware of what can be done about a given situation” (1984, 145). He saw the search for meaning as the main motivational force throughout life. Asserting that meaning is to be found in the outside world, he called the universal tendency whereby individuals are driven to constantly seek external objects, be they people, accomplishments, or successful adherence to personal moral standards, the will to meaning (108):

There is nothing in the world, I venture to say, that would so effectively help one to survive even the worst conditions as the knowledge that there is meaning in one’s life...In the Nazi concentration camps, one could have witnessed that those who knew that there was a task waiting for them to fulfill were most apt to survive. (Frankl 1984, 109)

For Frankl, meaning took many different forms, but such motivational forces as love and religious belief were, for him, completely authentic, carrying as much psychological weight as material goals or worldly ambitions. For instance, Frankl himself cited “love” as the quality which motivated his yearning to survive the years he spent in concentration camps during WWII. He described his relationship with his wife as the meaningful motivator which was so strong as to overcome his own hopelessness and intense suffering:

I understood how a man who has nothing left in this world still may know bliss, be it only for a brief moment, in the contemplation of his beloved. In a position of utter desolation, when man cannot express himself in positive action, when his only achievement may consist in enduring his sufferings in the right way—an honorable way—in such a position man can, through loving contemplation of the image he carries of his beloved, achieve fulfillment. (Frankl 1984, 49)

Similarly, for Frankl, religious belief constituted another motivator sufficient to inspire persistence in the face of terrible suffering. While he did not delve deeply into religious meaning in his biographical account, he acknowledged that it played a role in helping countless prisoners cling to hope as they trudged on day after day in the camps, and how after liberation, its value was often fixed in the mind of the survivor: “The crowning experience of all, for the
homecoming man, is the wonderful feeling that, after all he has suffered, there is nothing he need fear any more—except his God” (Frankl 1984, 100).

Turning away from the example of WWII, Frankl explained that for an individual, formulating and adhering to a meaningful goal is fulfilling and safeguards against frustration and dissatisfaction in life, even in the most mundane circumstances. Frankl deliberately used terminology that suggests that one must choose one’s own meaning (1984, 113). This reveals his view that on some level, persons must consciously come to realize what external goal will fulfill them, enriching their lives with meaning as they work to achieve it. The form meaning takes can differ for each person.

One’s work to lessen the gap between where or who one is and what one aspires to be is characterized by what Frankl called existential tension, the positive tension from aspiration which motivates self-betterment. Personal meaning is found in working towards that desired future (110). In Frankl’s view, true equilibrium is not only impossible, but would theoretically be harmful to an individual. Equilibrium would imply no level of dissatisfaction, no ambitions or aspirations. In this situation, an individual would lack complete motivation to accomplish any goals or improve him- or herself in any way. Though the complete absence of motivation to improve one’s situation is impossible, Frankl explained that an overabundance of unfocused tension, called existential frustration, is a very common affliction. This state is characterized by the absence of a freely chosen “task” of some kind. Without a personal goal to provide meaning and motivation to better oneself, an individual will feel empty. Over time the frustration grows if the individual’s circumstances remain static, and this frustration is experienced as boredom and manifests in neurotic and depressive symptoms (112).

Frankl emphasized that the solution to existential frustration, therefore, is to seek meaning through a freely chosen goal. He explained that the phrase “the meaning of life” is misleading in that it suggests that there is one source of meaning and one path towards its achievement. Frankl believed, rather, that the source of meaning, as an external goal, necessarily differs for each individual and can differ from one moment to the next within a single person’s life. As a result, he asserted that no psychoanalyst could possibly explain what the meaning of life is to a client, or what clients should do to improve their life satisfaction (113). Instead, one must select that goal for oneself. Attribution of meaning requires a free and genuine choice, rather than one made through a sense of obligation or duty: “By declaring that man is responsible and must actualize the potential meaning of his life, I wish to stress that the true
meaning of life is to be discovered in the world rather than within man or his own psyche, as through it were a closed system” (115). Accordingly, persons must seek to accomplish their goals or live by their chosen doctrines on their own, such that they will personally experience fulfillment: “Everyone’s task is as unique as is his specific opportunity to implement it” (113).

Frankl illustrated his theory using vivid examples from the concentration camps of WWII. Clearly, those prisoners lived under extreme stress, within “the war of nerves,” as Frankl coined it (20). According to Frankl, the prisoners’ existence was characterized by the total absence of control over their lives, as well as by the loss of their capacity to be themselves as individuals (1984, 44-45). Despite the sense of helplessness they experienced, Frankl asserted that profound meaning could be found in that situation, and with it, a modicum of comfort could be felt. Frankl observed this phenomenon himself during his years in several concentration camps. As he explained, when all one could think about was survival, the sense of meaning and the presence of an external goal of some kind was often the only aspect of a prisoner’s past self that he or she preserved (45). One whose sense of individuality and whose dignity had been entirely stripped away had no alternative but to choose between wasting away in despair or taking up the responsibility for finding meaning within the situation. In the camps, some found meaning in making the effort to maintain their humanity in the face of so much brutality and wickedness. Others found meaning in simply seeking to suffer well, and thus clung to the fragmented sense of who they understood themselves to be before the war (117), and who they hoped they would become again once it had ended:

In view of the possibility of finding meaning in suffering, life’s meaning is an unconditional one, at least potentially. That unconditional meaning, however, is paralleled by the unconditional value of each and every person...Just as life remains potentially meaningful under any conditions, even those which are most miserable, so too does the value of each and every person stay with him or her. (Frankl 1984, 153)

Frankl argued that there is no situation that cannot be enriched with meaning. Any situation presents a challenge to be mastered, even the most horrible and hopeless (113). In the case of the concentration camps, those who survived had more often clung to a goal or a hope throughout their imprisonment. More so than physical stamina or strength, Frankl observed that the sense of having meaning in one’s life, sharpened by each man or woman’s particular goal, was often a safeguard against death (47).

As we saw above in greater detail, both Frankl and Loewald sought to
understand how personal meaning, or the sense of a greater significance to an act or circumstance that extends beyond its functionality, has the capacity to incite an actor throughout life. The authors’ points of focus differed considerably, however. Loewald aimed to understand the processes behind the sense of meaning and how, essentially, the human psyche maintains its health throughout life. He felt that health is maintained through the equilibrium and interplay of two types of mentation, provided that neither is overly dominant. Both primary and secondary process mentation must serve to influence conscious life in order for an individual to successfully manoeuvre the external world (Loewald, 30). The secondary process notion of the self’s distinction from other things serves an important purpose in the outside world. It provides a point of origin from which events take place and makes the meaning of “self-preservation” intuitively understood. Primary process mentation, with its rejection of alienating boundaries, provides the perception of likeness and unity, connection, and timelessness that feed into the rational life of the individual, coloring it at every moment. Therefore, according to Loewald, meaning and religiosity could only thrive within the correspondence of primary and secondary process, from the contrast and complementarity of these two forms of mentation (Loewald 1978, 61).

Unlike Loewald, Frankl was less internally-focused. He sought to understand how personal meaning serves individuals throughout their lives. He believed that a therapeutic method that highlighted this domain of human existence, prioritizing it over drive-satisfaction, ambition to succeed, or a conscious effort to “be happy,” would ultimately lead to more adaptive lives (1984, 118). Frankl replaced process with choice, and thus the differences between his and Loewald’s definitions of “meaning” were fairly stark. Loewald used the term “meaning” to describe the involuntary product of the mutual interaction of primary and secondary internal processes. Frankl, on the other hand, referred to meaning as a quality one consciously attributes to particular external tasks or goals. This quality, if matched with the proper goal for self-betterment or accomplishment, inspires superior motivation and passion.

Though Frankl and Loewald defined meaning differently, their theories are complementary to some extent. Loewald explained in his lectures that the sense of timelessness and the oceanic characterize meaningful experiences throughout life. These, he explained, are moments when primary process mentation is most apparent in conscious experience (Loewald 1978, 64-65). Accordingly, part one of Frankl’s book, entitled Experiences in a Concentration Camp illustrated a tendency for what he called “the deepening of inner life” in
response to the horrors of life as a prisoner in a concentration camp (1984, 47). He provided the following example of such an instance:

One evening, when we were already resting on the floor of our hut, dead tired, soup bowls in hand, a fellow prisoner rushed in and asked us to run out to the assembly grounds and see the wonderful sunset. Standing outside we saw sinister clouds glowing in the west and the whole sky alive with clouds of ever-changing shapes and colours, from steel-blue to blood red...then after minutes of moving silence, one prisoner said to another ‘How beautiful the world could be!’ (51)

Frankl’s “deepening of inner life” can be understood along the lines of Loewald’s theory. One could say that a concentration camp prisoner, whose only focus is survival from impending starvation, illness, and violence, loses her or his individual sense of self to a large degree. The differentiating barriers, which have been constructed via secondary process throughout their lives, begin to crumble in light of such stressful and dangerous circumstances. In this state of extreme deprivation and stress, an unconscious disequilibrium results. Primary process mentation gains ground, and greater salience is attributed to certain types of experiences: namely, those which reinforce the sense of connection to others, timelessness, and eternity, such as the sight of a beautiful sunset. Under these circumstances, meaning gains significance in the mental life of the prisoner.

A major strength of Loewald’s theories of primary and secondary processes and meaning is that they are both intuitive and readily applicable to human experience. Individuals living their lives in an ordinary way could well be living in a state of equilibrium, with both types of mentation co-occurring in consciousness and in the unconscious. Frankl, by contrast, based his theory of meaning on an extremely atypical circumstance. In his experiences as a prisoner, he found that the conscious selection and attribution of personal meaning to some external goal was the best way to preserve hope and to ultimately survive. His theory assumed disequilibrium as a given, which is not surprising since he formulated it in an environment of immense stress and anguish. Whether or not his postulates hold water in modern Western living conditions is more difficult to ascertain, but it is clear that his therapeutic approach, called logotherapy, serves a purpose in particular contexts. Frankl contrasts his method with psychoanalysis, describing it thusly:

Logotherapy focuses rather on the future, that is to say, on the meanings to be fulfilled by the patient in his future. (Logotherapy, indeed, is a meaning-centered psychotherapy.) At the same time, logotherapy defocuses all the vicious-circle formations and feedback mechanisms which play such a great role in the
development of neuroses. Thus, the typical self-centeredness of the neurotic is broken up instead of being continually fostered and reinforced. (1984, 104)

While Frankl and Loewald’s theories differ a great deal, I consider both theories to be of value in outlining the function and significance of meaning in various circumstances of human life.

In closing, allow me to address some problematic points in Frankl’s and Loewald’s theories. To begin, I wish to point out that while Loewald’s theory of meaning as a function of primary and secondary process unconscious integration is comprehensive and intuitive, its weakness rests in its assumption of an initial merger between infant and mother. While this view is compelling, it remains one theory of infant development that has yet to be proven. Consequently, if we do not accept the premise of primary unity, the notions of primary process and secondary process lose their backing. Daniel Stern, for instance, asserted his rejection of an early period of undifferentiation or merger between the newborn infant and the mother in *The Interpersonal World of the Infant*:

> [T]he various important experiences of being with mother are founded on the assumption that the infant cannot adequately differentiate self from other. In contrast to these views, the present account has stressed the very early formation of a sense of a core self and core other during the life period that other theories allot to prolonged self/other undifferentiation. Further, in the present view, experiences of being with an other are seen as active acts of integration, rather than as passive failures of differentiation. (Stern 1985, 101)

Whether or not Loewald fell into the camp of those who endorse “passive failure of differentiation” as the origin of self/other understanding, it remains clear that the foundational notion of primary unity, the state of undifferentiation Loewald called primary process mentation, remains under debate. It therefore constitutes unstable ground upon which to base a theory of lifespan development and the origin of meaning in human life.

My disagreement with Frankl’s theory of meaning concerns his emphasis on individualism. As we have already discussed, Frankl understood meaning to be unique to each individual and each life situation. Furthermore, he explained that the accomplishment of meaningful goals can only be achieved through individual striving. His theory’s individualism is echoed in Frankl’s accounts of the concentration camps, whereby he emphasized that each individual was essentially on his or her own, fighting alone for survival amid the masses of like-minded others, who had grown unsympathetic to others’ suffering:

> One morning I heard someone, whom I knew to be brave and dignified, cry like a
child because he finally had to go to the snowy marching grounds in his bare feet, as his shoes were too shrunken for him to wear. In those ghastly minutes, I found a little bit of comfort; a small piece of bread which I drew out of my pocket and munched with absorbed delight. (Frankl 1984, 44)

While these events of callous self-centeredness were likely very common, greater acknowledgement of the role of relationships within the camps, or of the improvised cultural activities among prisoners in raising morale and promoting survival, would have been warranted. Additionally, Frankl’s notion of individual fulfillment and self-motivated meaning relies heavily on the notion of the mind as capable of transcending the body, even needing to transcend it at times of great stress or physical hardship.

This view of the dichotomous mind/body has been highly criticized by many feminist philosophers such as Rudavsky, Shapiro, and Adler, among others. The school of thought which asserts that the mind is abstract and distinct is a problematic place to situate oneself in formulating any sort of theory pertaining to human characteristics and tendencies, for the sole reason that it is an artificial dichotomy. Contemporary feminist philosophers understand humans to be embodied, and as such, their physical states and needs determine their emotional and intellectual worlds and vice-versa. Additionally, humans are permanently and irrevocably embedded in relationships and cultural contexts throughout their lives. Frankl’s theory, therefore, was overly reliant on Western philosophical dualistic notions, which, if inaccurate, weaken his conclusions, and ultimately his therapeutic method as well.

To conclude, one must ask whether the theories of Frankl and Loewald succeeded in broadening psychoanalysis to include meaning to a greater degree and to suggest a greater complexity to the phenomenon of religion than Freud asserted, with his understanding of it as simply an illusion. Despite the weaknesses of each approach, Frankl and Loewald nevertheless suggest that a broadening of our understanding of meaning and religion is essential. Loewald proposed a theory of the origin of meaning, and Frankl offered a theory for how meaning can be used to better people’s lives through logotherapy. Though their theories do not fit together seamlessly, their very different foci contribute to our understanding of meaning as a multidimensional concept. For this reason, each has made valuable contributions to the study of meaning and religion in human lives through their psychoanalytic theories.
WORKS CITED


