THE UBIQUITY OF PREHENSION: 
PANPSYCHISM AS A SOLUTION TO THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM

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Introduction
This paper is an essay in the philosophy of mind. Its focus is on the mind-body problem as a perennial issue in the unraveling of mentality, and on panpsychism as a viable alternative to both the humanist and mechanist solutions which have dominated the discourse in recent years. As such, the paper examines the problem itself, charting its origins and exploring its nature. It then proceeds to define panpsychism and give a brief account of its history and manifestations. This is followed by a similar treatment of the two primary modes of objection to the panpsychist thesis: humanistic dualism and mechanistic materialism. The panpsychist meta-theory—and more specifically the panexperientialist variant—is then defended as a superior response to the problem via a series of interconnected arguments recently elucidated by process philosophers such as Alfred North Whitehead, David Ray Griffin and D.S. Clarke. Following this argumentation, the metaphysical picture which arises from the acceptance of the panpsychist argument is discussed, for the ramifications of panpsychism affect far greater philosophical vistas than just the philosophy of mind—stretching into the both ontology and ethics.

The central question with which this paper concerns itself is the mind-body problem: “What exactly are the relations between the mental and the physical, and in particular how can there be causal relations between them?”1 To fully grasp what is meant by this question, some background on its origin will prove beneficial. The mind-body problem arose in the middle of the 17th century from the methodology developed by René Descartes during the course of his Meditations.2 Descartes began his daily meditations by seeking to discover what aspects of his experience could be doubted and which could not. In due course, he concluded that the only thing of which he could be absolutely certain was that he existed. For, his methodical doubt had led him to believe that although he could call into question sensory data received from sight, sound, touch, taste and smell—thinking that this data would be fed to him was predicated upon the existence of Descartes as a thinking subject, in other words, as a mind. Thus, he deduced that the one piece of data which could be trusted was non-sensory: the psyche’s experience of itself as a center of subjectivity.

While this non-sensory, experiential justification for the belief in the reality of one’s mind is not only not a point of contention between Cartesian dualists

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and panpsychists, the latter often explicitly root their arguments in this very experience. However, what is contested by panpsychists is Descartes’ train of reasoning which leads from the known existence of mind to a declaration of mind and body being composed of distinct metaphysical substances. It is this idea, that mentality and physicality are fundamentally different in an ontological sense that gives rise to the mind-body problem. For, if such is the case, how can something physical be acted upon by something mental, and vice versa? While Descartes phrased the problem somewhat differently than is done today—questioning how the soul, which was created by God, was able to act upon the body—the question of how the two substances interact still forms the core of the problem which is currently thought of in terms of “how can brain processes produce mental phenomena?”

Panpsychism Defined

The central question being such, the reader may now ask what is panpsychism and how does it address the mind-body problem? One of the most active participants in the contemporary revival of panpsychism, David Skrbina, defines it as “the view that all things have mind, or a mind-like quality.” Although the concept is among the oldest of all philosophical ideas—being found in the thought of Thales, the first of the pre-Socratics—the term itself owes its genesis to the 16th century Italian philosopher Francisca Patrizi, deriving from the Greek roots pan (πᾶν—“all” or “everything”) and psuchē (ψῡχή—“mind, breath,” or “spirit”). A further expansion on the preliminary definition is provided by Freya Mathews, detailing panpsychism as “the view that every material object is also a subject,” a position that includes “any view that reunites mentality with materiality, and thereby dismantles the foundational dualism of Western thought.” Mathews’ definition brings up an important point in the discussion of panpsychism, noting that it is a meta-theory that encompasses a number of specific theories which are at odds with each other; “it is a statement about theories, not a theory in itself.”

Panpsychism is, thus, a family of philosophies of mind—a family whose principle contemporary member is the panexperientialism that this paper explores.

Its ultimate origins laying the pre-philosophical animism of early man, panpsychism’s history as a philosophical doctrine begins with the pre-Socratics, nearly all of whom ascribed to the hylozoist variant. Hylozoism, from the Greek hūle (ὕλη—“matter” or lit. “wood”) and zōē (ζωή—“living” or “life”), was embodied in the beliefs of thinkers as disparate as Thales, Anaximenes, and Heraclitus in an interfused throughout the universe: which is perhaps why Thales supposed all things to be full of gods,” (Aristotle, De Anima, trans R.D. Hicks, [New York: Cosimo Classics, 2008], 33).

Ibid.


Skrbina, 2.

Ibid., 24.
inherently animated universe whose fundamental substance(s) teemed with life. This view was refined into panpsychism proper by Plato, from whose doctrine of the World Soul led to the creation of perhaps the longest lived panpsychism: the ensouled universe of pantheism and panentheism.\textsuperscript{11} Pantheism, from the Greek \textit{pan} (πᾶν—“all”) and \textit{theos} (θεός—“God”) is the doctrine which treats “God” and “the World” as identical ontological categories. The related panentheism, is differentiated by the inclusion of the -\textit{en} (ἐν—“in”) suffix, which denotes the position that “the World” exists within “God” in an ontological manner.\textsuperscript{12} Plato’s model of panpsychism, which granted some type of mind-like quality to the individual constituents of the world by virtue of their being reflections of the ideal Form of the World-Soul, brings up an important classificatory distinction that can be made between panpsychist theories. For, Plato’s formulation is the root of those theories which posit that mentality or soul is present in \textit{all} only because the world as \textit{a whole} is in possession of mentality. This kind of top-down panpsychism “is significantly different from the thesis...in which each thing \textit{individually} is ensouled.”\textsuperscript{13} The top-down class of theories do ascribe mentality to everything, but only insofar as the sum total of everything is \textit{itself} a mind-bearing subject, whereas the bottom-up grouping finds mind in the constituents \textit{themselves}. Prior to the turn of the century with the emergence of process theology, the former tended to be the theistic form of panpsychism—as espoused by legions of Medieval Neoplatonists, Enlightenment pantheists, and Romantic panentheists—while the latter class tended to be the mode of expression used by the non-theistic hylozoists of the ancient world and the pre-modern pansensists (lit. “everything senses”) such as Bernardino Telesio, Tommaso Campanella and Ernst Mach.\textsuperscript{14} This is not to say that bottom-up formulations of panpsychism are necessarily \textit{atheistic}, but rather that they do not rely on the presumption of theism as an \textit{a priori} proposition. Indeed, there are very few pre-20\textsuperscript{th} century panpsychisms that do \textit{not} have a religious dimension.

With the turn of the century there arose a new breed of panpsychists within the Anglo-American philosophical tradition: those who took “pure experience” as the unifying link between mentality and physicality.\textsuperscript{15} Panexperientialism is, like the pansensism (lit. “everything senses”) which came before it, a \textit{neutral monist} theory of mind. What this means is that rather than proposing that all of reality is material (physicalistic monism), that all is mental (idealistic monism), or that there are separate mental and physical substances (dualism), the neutral monist posits that there is a single mental and physical substance (monism), but that it is neither mind nor matter (neutral).\textsuperscript{16} Under the panexperientialist’s metaphysics, this singular substance is the \textit{event}. Also referred to by Whitehead as \textit{actual entities} or \textit{actual occasions}, these “are

\textsuperscript{11}John W. Cooper, \textit{Panentheism: The Other God of the Philosophers}, (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2006), 33.
\textsuperscript{12}Ibid., 26-27.
\textsuperscript{13}Skrbina, 35.
\textsuperscript{14}Ibid., 20-21.
\textsuperscript{15}William James, \textit{A Pluralistic Universe}, (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1920), 348.
the final real things of which the world is made. There is no going behind… [them] to find anything more real."\(^{17}\)

What Whitehead has done by putting forth the event as the fundamental constituent of reality is to bring Western metaphysics up to speed with Einstein's special theory of relativity, in which the inseparability of spatiality from temporality results in the space-time event being the elementary unit of analysis.\(^{18}\) That is to say that, for example, when we speak of John Doe, we are not speaking of John as a spatial object who persists through, but is intrinsically divorced from, time. Rather that the John of the here and now is an event—an event which incorporates both spatial extension in the form of his body and temporal extension in the form of his being the present moment's culmination of a *process* that led to the occurrence of the space-time event that is John at this moment in time. This insistence on the processual nature of reality and in the primacy of becoming over being is what has earned the thought of Whitehead and his students the moniker of *process philosophy*.

But what has the neutral monism of treating the event as ontologically primary have to do with the nature of mind, or with experience? The answer lies in Whitehead's conception of the event as being *dipolar* in nature. Dipolarity has the meaning that every event has both a physical and mental pole of experience.\(^{19}\) Taking a human being as an example, we are intimately aware of two aspects of ourselves. That we have an internal, subjective, mental pole is—as Descartes' phenomenological investigations shewed—not subject to any doubt. That we are also in possession of an external, objective, physical pole is confirmed by our interactions and relations with the world around us. Where the panexperientialist *differs* from Descartes is in conclusion that these two modes of perception—the internal experience of being a mind, and the external experience of being a body—are manifestations of two distinct substances at play. Nay, the panexperientialist finds that his experience of himself as a self leads him to the conclusion that “mind, in other words, is sheer interiority, matter sheer externality,”—that the two are experiential modalities of *one* organism, not a house divided.\(^{20}\) What this thesis then entreats us to consider is that dipolarity is not an attribute particular only to humans, or even to animals, but is a universal feature of *all* actual occasions—thus extending an internal dimension of experience to events. This root-level form of experience is *non-sensory* in nature, being the mind's experience of itself as a mind; this mode of experience is not contingent upon *any* of the five external senses, but is rather a form of pure, unadulterated experience. This non-sensory mode of perception is termed *prehension* by Whitehead, and “is the receptivity…with which every occasion of experience begins.”\(^{21}\)

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\(^{20}\) Mathews, 26.

Alternatives
Panpsychism having been thus defined, the two primary alternatives, humanism and mechanism, will be explored. Since the time of Descartes, philosophical humanism has been one of the dominant streams of thought in philosophy of mind, and is thus one of the primary sources of “the incredulity with which panpsychism is usually greeted.”22 The humanist argues that mentality bears three attributes which are exclusively proper to humans: linguistic capacity, reflexive consciousness, and free will.23 The capability for humans to use language, it is argued, demonstrates that there is a clear distinction between humanity and all other types of life—thus bifurcating nature into two categories: humans and everything else.24 Similarly do humanists posit that mind is necessarily reflexive, that mind is only mind by virtue of being able to be cognizant of its own consciousness. Free will is treated correspondingly, with the humanist proposing that the experience we have of being able to make up our minds and genuinely decide between alternative courses of action is an intrinsic feature of mind, and that this free agency is, again, privy to humankind.25 For, the Cartesian humanist believes that “our minds are the source of our freedom, our capacity to choose between alternatives through acts of will that cause our bodily movements. Our bodies, in contrast, are governed by the mechanical laws investigated by the natural sciences.”26 Thus are all entities aside from men wholly determined in their actions. Inanimate objects are ruled by physical and chemical laws, plants and animals by biological instincts which are merely responses to environmental stimuli. Humanity alone is capable of demonstrating externally (via linguistic ability) and knowing internally (via conscious reflexivity) that their behaviors are exempt from these rigidly determined laws.

The panexperientialist “theory of 'prehensions' embodies a protest against the 'bifurcation' of nature.”27 One of the immediate problems that humanistic dualism begets is the sheer improbability of the bifurcation itself. “For humanism, somehow during roughly the past 100,000 years…one species became miraculously endowed with very special features that distinguish it from all that has gone on before.”28 With the specifically Cartesian variety, this presents no major problem, as humanity has been directly endowed with this gift by God with the ensoulment of mankind. However, for those—theists and atheists alike—who are not willing to place a deus ex machina kind of explanation at the very core of philosophy of mind, the singular nature of mentality as being distinctly human proves a troublesome proposition. For, excepting the possibility of divine intervention, how is it possible much less probable that a wholly divergent substance suddenly came into being and has only done so within a single species? And, even if such a miraculous event were to occur, the further problem of substantial

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23 Ibid.
24 Searle, 17-18.
25 Ibid., 16.
26 Clarke, 56.
27 Whitehead, 289.
28 Clarke, 57.
interaction looms in the distance—the mind-body problem. “All forms of substance dualism inherit Descartes' problem of how to give a coherent account of the causal relations between the soul and body.”

Descartes attempted to solve this problem of the interaction between the mind and body by theorizing that the pineal gland somehow functioned as a bridge between the two, that “the soul has its principal seat in the little gland.”

However, as a biological understanding of the pineal gland's function as the producer of melatonin became understood, Descartes' notion of it as being the “seat of the soul” quickly fell out of favor.

How then, is this substance dualism to be explained? How does a brain, which has no consciousness, no mentality of its own interact with a conscious soul which has been grafted to it? Substance dualism is a theory which, when compounded with advances in modern physics has become less and less tenable. For, “substance dualism seems to imply that there is...[a kind of] mental energy or spiritual energy, that is not fixed by physics,” that is outside of the purview of the laws of thermodynamics, thus rendering them null and void.

This line of reasoning, finding dualism to be more riddled with problems than answers, has led to its rejection not only by panpsychists, but by materialists as well. For, if dualism fails, “it is natural to suppose that maybe there is only one kind of thing in the universe,” which is metaphysical monism. However, the materialistic monism that has largely replaced humanism responds to the mind-body problem in a vastly different way than does the neutral monism of panexperientialism. Rather than integrate the bifurcated spheres of mentality and physicality, the materialist eliminates the former leaving only matter in its place.

This monistic family of philosophies of mind takes three general forms. Identity theory holds that “mental states are real but that these states are identical with brain states.” What this does is to reduce mental activity to neural activity, which deals with both the problem of interaction by accepting only the existence of a single material substance, and with the problem of the mind's emergence by explaining it wholly in terms of the brain's evolution. The second class of materialist theories is functionalism, “which argues that mental states are real and that they are identical with a particular 'process state,' or state of information.” Where functionalism differs from identity theory is that it does not rely on specifically neural structures in its definition of mind. Indeed, the functionalist theory applies equally to any sufficiently complex physical system, which makes it the preferred position for proponents of strong artificial intelligence. Lastly, there is the family of eliminativism, which is “the view that mind is somehow imaginary or

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29Searle, 29.
32Searle, 30.
33Ibid., 33.
34Skrbina, 8.
35Ibid., 9
This radical theory is, in many ways, the logical consequence of behavioralism, which treats mind as a mistakenly labeled category that is naught but a remnant of pre-scientific ways of thinking about the world. The eliminativist would explain everything in purely physical terms, erasing any reference to the very ideas of consciousness or mentality.

Core Arguments
It is in the midst of these two perspectives that panpsychism reasserts itself as a contemporary theory of mind worthy of consideration. Previously were panpsychist theories of mind explored as systems, but naught was said of those systems' derivations—of why anyone would adopt a position which is as counterintuitive as panpsychism. As it has been a philosophically articulated position for roughly 2,600 years, there are many distinct ways of arguing in favor of the panpsychist result. This paper will examine a related group of arguments which are incorporated into what David Skrbina calls the “core argument” for adopting panpsychism. The argument assimilates the following lines of reasoning: the argument from indwelling powers, the argument by continuity, and the argument from non-emergence.

The first part of the core argument, the indwelling powers section, proposes that “all objects exhibit certain powers or abilities that can plausibly be linked to noetic qualities.” The argument from indwelling powers is very similar to Descartes cogito examined previously. This is the argument that the self's prehension of itself as a dipolar subject with mental and physical aspects sufficiently demonstrates the reality and interrelatedness of both mind and body. This argument takes into account our autophenomenological knowledge of our own mental and physical existence as well as our heterophenomenological knowledge of the same reality of external subjects with whom we interact. The indwelling powers argument directly addresses the eliminativist thesis which claims mind is unreal, the idealist thesis of the unreality of the body, as well as dualist theories which posit that there is an ontological separation between the two. For, our intimate prehension of ourselves is one of holistic unity. We experience ourselves as real, whole centers of subjectivity.

The argument from indwelling powers does not, however, sufficiently demonstrate the ubiquity of prehension, and could thus be utilized to prop up a neutral monistic variant of humanism which adhered to the idea of mentality and physicality being polar aspects of one substance but only admitted that dipolarity applied to humanity. Thus, to extend the thesis outwards from ourselves as the center, the argument by continuity is raised. This argument posits that not only are mind and body poles of a common substance, but also that there is an irresolvable problem with attempting to draw a firm line between “enminded and supposedly mindless objects.” This argument works in a variety of ways to combat what it views as fallacious dichotomies and mistakenly concretized separations between types. For example, if we accept the indwelling powers argument and agree that humans are enminded,

\[36\text{Ibid.}\]
\[37\text{Ibid., 250-254.}\]
\[38\text{Ibid., 250.}\]

\[39\text{Ibid.}\]
where is the line drawn between mind bearing humans and mindless apes? As Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, the father of evolutionary biology, noted all classificatory systems are fictive in nature.\(^{40}\) That there is some type of distinction between a chimpanzee and a man is not doubted, but that there is an intrinsic distinction between these two groups as discrete classes is. For, all such taxonomic systems are purely artificial in nature, and thus cement our understandings of differentiations of continua into discontinuous categories. Thus does the argument by continuity impel us to look backwards in our evolutionary history and see the absurdity of attempting to delimit the point at which we made the transition from being mindless animals whose behaviors were determined to enminded humans with free will. For if the humanist thesis is correct, then there had to have been a discrete point at which this monumental shift occurred. Yet, such a distinction between man and his non-human ancestors is admittedly a fiction—an artificial schema used to pragmatically group differentiations within a continuum. That being the case, the same line of reasoning holds true in determining the transition points between anything, for there is a smooth evolutionary continuum that leads from non-living matter to 21\(^{st}\) century man. Thus does the continuity argument extend mentality of some form to all.

The closely related argument from non-emergence rounds out the core argument for panpsychism. This position proposes that “it is inconceivable that mind should emerge from a world in which no mind existed; therefore mind always existed, in even the simplest of structures.”\(^{41}\) The non-emergence argument attempts to seal up the last gap in this line of argumentation. For, even if both the preceding arguments were accepted, it would be possible to argue that mind emerged from non-mind in roughly the same way that humans emerged from non-humans, on a continuous path. What the argument from non-emergence does is to acknowledge that mentality is such that its emergence is impossible. There is a radical and complete difference between the conceptions of a mind-bearing subject with free will and an inert object whose actions are determined. The difference is so great that the humanists erected an ontological wall between the two—so great that the materialists eliminated mind and free agency entirely. In arguments from non-emergence, the mental property of novelty or spontaneity takes center stage. Novel behavior is behavior that cannot be predicted by physical laws. It “is that which is done from the point of view of the organism,” and is the mental attribute that manifests itself as the freedom to make true decisions between courses of action—decisions that are not purely the consequences of genetic and environmental factors.\(^{42}\) We know, internally, that this is an attribute we are in possession of, yet is it sensible to conceive of novelty emerging from its absence? Panpsychists would claim that “it is a contradiction in terms to assume that some explanatory fact can float into the actual world out of nonentity,” and that novelty is such a fundamental central fact of the human experience that the very notion of its emergence is

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\(^{41}\)Skrbina, 250.

\(^{42}\)Clarke, 124.
nonsensical. These three arguments come together in an interwoven manner to form the core argument, which we can now articulate as follows. Mind is real; we experience it as an inseparable, intrinsic aspect of ourselves. Our bodies are real; we experience them as we experience the mind, as perceiving extensions of the prehending mental cores of our beings. We do not experience any manner of bifurcation between the two, but experience mentality and physicality as singular, unified wholes. We know that some parts of our physicality are unique (e.g. our human forms are particular to humans, our mammalian features are particular to mammals, etc.), but our physical nature itself is universal; all that we encounter can be interacted with as physical objects. We also know that some parts of our mentality are unique, as with the body, yet the principle of continuation that holds true for physicality holds true for mentality as well—entreating us to think that a facility for prehension is universal as well. Since our mentality and physicality are intrinsically connected and experienced as dipolar faces of a single entity, so can we assume is the case for all. Further, complete and total difference between the novelty that we experience as being conterminous with our mentality is so radically different from its absence, determinism, that its emergence is inconceivable. “Therefore, panpsychism must be true. QED.”

Objections
The case for panpsychism being such, the principle objection to the panpsychist position is its implausibility. As Clarke asks, are we, in adopting panpsychism, going to propose that thermostats have minds in the same way that we have minds? Panpsychist responses to this critique differ wildly, with some stronger forms of animism and hylozoism answering in the affirmative. However, the panexperientialism this paper seeks to defend counters this charge with its very definition of mentality. For, panexperientialism is not proposing that the kind of complex consciousness that is manifest in humanity is any more omnipresent than is our particular material configuration. The interconnectedness of the material and mental means that the more unified and persistent the physical organization of the entity in question is, then the more complex will the object's mental organization be. The prehension that panexperientialism posits to be universal is the mental equivalent of what a fundamental particle is to matter. It is the primary core from which all mental structures of advanced evolution are built. That all objects prehend no more makes them conscious in the same way that we are than does the fact that all are made of the same fundamental particles make them able to taste or smell the way that we do. Prehension is the internal relatedness of the object to the world around it. It “denotes the bare process of seizing, excluding extraneous notions of…consciousness.” However, it is only in what Whitehead calls compound individuals—that is, a sentient individual composed of lower-order

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43 Whitehead, 46.
44 Škrbin, 254.
45 Ibid.
46 Clarke, 4.
47 Ibid., 1.
individuals such as cells, molecules, atoms, and ultimately ‘occasions of experience,’‖ do we find something relatable to the human mind.49

The second objection, which itself emerges from considerations of the first, is namely: what is the distinction between compound individuals like humans or dogs who obviously are self-organized, mind-bearing subjects, and aggregates like a pile of sand or a garage which, although formally complex, are somehow distinct from true individuals? This is a serious problem and if not addressed properly threatens to give rise to an ontological dualism between individuals and aggregates that is just as metaphysically damning as is the mind-body dualism of Descartes. It is here, again, that the concept of the continuum comes into play. For, the difference between an individual and an aggregate is, according to Griffin, not an ontological duality, but “only an organizational duality.”50 So, we might say that “the rock has experience in it—the primitive animist was this far correct; but the rock itself, considered as a whole, has no experience over and above that of its molecular parts.”51 Though a rock and a man are both collections of actual occasions, the latter displays a degree of self-regulatory homeostasis and unity that the former does not. Although, as the rock does display some of these attributes, we can say that the two exist on a continuum of individuality—that, rather than a “true” individual being something wholly different from an aggregate, that there is a fluid boundary between the two.

A third objection arises from the panexperientialist's insistence on the ubiquity not only of prehension but also of novelty and spontaneity. This objection is really the mirror opposite of the objection to mechanism's complete denial of novelty in favor of determinism. The mechanist would counter the panexperientialist's assertion by questioning that if all events, excepting the already contested example of humans, are novel in nature then why do physical laws as fixed stabilities appear to govern the world. To this, the panexperientialist would argue that these laws are not fixed, that “the laws of nature…are merely transitory stabilities that emerge at one phase of cosmic history only to lapse from creation and give way to variant modes of operation in the fullness of time.”52 And, while “all genuine individuals have at least some iota of freedom…higher-grade, more evolved individuals have more freedom: cells more than molecules, psyches more than cells, human psyches more than chimpanzee psyches.”53 This gradation of capacity for novel behavior must also take into account the nature of conditioning. For, prehensions, moments of experience, are conditioned by their past—they are, in their capacity as instances of pure receptivity, uniquely open to the continually patterned influences of their past actions upon their future courses.54 So, while novelty does pervade the real in the same way that materiality and prehension does, its manifestational strength is contingent upon the internal complexity and level of self-organization in the organism being

49Skrbina, 244.
50Griffin, 24.
51Ibid.
53Griffin, 26.
54Ibid.
considered.

**Conclusion**
If then, we accept the panexperientialist thesis, what are the ramifications? The metaphysical, and specifically ontological, consequences of panexperientialism’s truth are embodied in process philosophy’s insistence on the primacy of the actual occasion or event as reality’s fundamental building block. The large scale outgrowth of this idea is manifest in the supposition that process affords the most effective conceptual tool with which to understand the world—that all things are reducible to processes. Thus do the process philosophers present us not with a world that changes, but with a world that is itself change. Rather than seeing the world as a collection of objects, it is seen as a sea of interrelated processes—all of which seethes with mentality and novelty. The ethical repercussions of the panpsychist shift are just as dramatic. Panexperientialism presents us with a worldview that affects a change in the way we, as humans, relate to the world around us. “It is easy to abuse dead, inanimate matter, or unconscious forms of life,” but the prospect of all the world being enminded tends to result in a transvaluation of our place as “masters of the universe” granted by philosophical humanism. The panexperientialist conclusion leads us to wholly reconsider our interactions both with non-human life and with non-living objects. For, if mind, in some shape, is borne by all, then behaving as if that were not the case likely has serious ethical consequences. Thus it is not surprising that contemporary panpsychists of all stripes, be they of the

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55 Rescher, 28.
56 Skrbina, 269.
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