Subjectivity and the Intuition of Time in Hegel’s 1830 *Geistesphilosophie*

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The goal of this paper is to interpret the relationship between subjectivity and the intuition of time in Hegel’s mature philosophical work. First, we propose a brief, hermeneutic reading of Hegel’s concept of Mind/Spirit as *Geist*, which helps contextualize our primary emphases. As we will argue, Hegel’s views on time and intuition are grounded within the structure of a certain approach to theorizing about subjectivity, which is conceptualized as *Geist*. Second, we explore the connection between intuition and time through both Hegel’s account of intuition from the third installment of the *Encyclopedia* and a contrasting exposition of the theories of intuition in Kant, Maimon, and Hegel. By demonstrating how Hegel’s ontological approach to intuition differs from Kant’s, Hegel’s theory avoids the pitfalls of subjective, transcendental idealism.

1. *Geist*

The relation between subjectivity and intuition is an important one for the tradition of German Idealism, especially in the post-Kantian projects of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. Beginning with Kant, the intuitions of space and time are subjective forms of experience that make no claim to know being as such. Hence, the epistemological Kantian approach relies on transcendental accounts of subjectivity, intuition, and time. Contrarily, Hegel’s own conceptualization of intuition is situated within a fundamentally different approach to subjectivity than Kant. Unlike Kant, Hegel delivers an ontological account of subjectivity. Thus, any account of Hegel on intuition must say something about his own view of subjectivity wherein his account of intuition is situation. Furthermore, this helps contextualize a more direct engagement between Kant and Hegel regarding the intuition of time.

Hegel’s corpus contains numerous discussions of subjectivity, all of which are systematically grounded within his tripartite approach to philosophy as a whole. The best picture of his system we possess is his three-part *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences in Outline* (1830). Hegel only published a stand-alone volume of *The Science of Logic*, which was supposed to be followed by similarly substantial works on Nature and Mind/Spirit, the system’s second and third moments respectively.¹ Our focus here is the system’s third moment, the *Geistesphilosophie*, which English readers familiar with Hegel may recognize as having been published in translation as Hegel’s *Philosophy of Mind*. More specifically, Hegel’s account of intuition occurs in the first part of the third volume of the *Geistesphilosophie*: Subjective *Geist*. Before proceeding to the account of intuition, it is worth pausing to briefly interpret this notion of *Geist* as an approach to theorizing about subjectivity and its ontological structure.

To summarize why Hegel’s account of subjectivity is ontological from the level of Hegel’s system itself, since all being is becoming, subjectivity is what becomes. This complex inference begins with Hegel’s adherence to Heraclitus’s thesis that being is becoming in Logic, then proceeds to develop how being becomes Nature, and then, finally, *Geist*. In other words, *Geist* is what comes to be from systematically thinking about being and Nature. English readers
of Hegel are accustomed to seeing *Geist* translated as either Mind or Spirit. For French readers, on the other hand, the issue is less problematic, since *Geist* is translated as *l'esprit*, and, like its German counterpart, contains both what is commonly understood by both potential English variants. That said, in our view, translating *Geist* as either Mind or Spirit is not always helpful, especially since in the divisions of Subjective *Geist* we encounter *Geist* as soul, consciousness, and intelligence—each of which are different modes of conceptualizing subjectivity as *Geist* and differing in degrees of complexity. Therefore, in employing *Geist* we intend for the reader to recognize that it is inclusive of both Mind and Spirit, and to acknowledge that the account of subjectivity from the *Geistesphilosophie* is exceptionally comprehensive and exceeds what we can address here in a limited form.

In order to advance to Hegel’s account of intuition in Subjective *Geist*, we must also qualify what Hegel intends by the term *subjective*, since the versatility of this term in his philosophy is particularly noteworthy, and because he employs the term *subjective* in more than one way. One usage, which still appears in common language today, refers to that which is one-sided, non-communal, selfish, and singular, as opposed to universal. Anything that is taken as one-sided in this way, that is, as a part isolated from a whole, cannot for Hegel constitute real and true knowledge, nor even a true idealism. Generally, this pejorative intention stands against what is rational through universal philosophical justification.

In its Hegelian intention, the word *subjective* refers to what is driven to becoming objective by determining itself. In other words, the subjective is what becomes objective because the essence of subjectivity is freedom, that is, self-determination, as Hegel announces in §382 of the introduction to the *Geistesphilosophie*. Another way to qualify this idea of subjectivity is through *Geist* as the non-transcendental complex of forms of knowledge, each differing in degrees of complexity, and whose ultimate aim is self-knowledge. Not only is this precisely what is at stake in Subjective *Geist* and the account of intuition, but the commandment “know thyself” is precisely that of *Geist* itself, as Hegel states explicitly in the opening paragraph, §377, of the *Geistesphilosophie*. Therefore, insofar as the *Geistesphilosophie* provides a meaningful account of self-knowing subjectivity (*Geist*), this must include an account of how we know—this account begins with intuition.

2. **Introduction to Intuition and Subjective *Geist***

Subjective *Geist* is divided into three subsections. The “Anthropology” first considers *Geist* in its immediate determination as natural corporeality, then the “Phenomenology” conceives *Geist* as consciousness, where a subject stands in a knowing relation to an oppositional object. Finally, the “Psychology” outlines a holistic theory of mental activity and provides a coherent account of how *Geist* cognitively encounters the everyday world beginning with a description of how the empirical grounds the activities of cognition. The “Psychology” is largely an account of the psychogenesis of thought [*Denken*], since it gives a thoroughgoing account of the foundations of fully developed, rational, linguistic thinking.

According to the “Psychology,” *Geist* is intelligence [*die Intelligenz*], which denotes a mode of knowing that is more complex than both immediate embodiment and the oppositional subject-object knowledge of consciousness. It is in the intelligence that the notion of a
self-determining, self-knowing subjectivity begins to have its structure explicitly defined. To that end, it is significant that the intelligence is defined by three moments: intuition [Anschauung], representation [Vorstellung], and thinking [Denken]. Although there is a tendency to think of psychological approaches in terms of dividing the mind into isolable faculties, this is far from Hegel’s own intention regarding the intelligence, which he treats as a developing whole.

Hegel considers a critique of isolable faculties of Geist when he develops the distinction between stages [Stufen] of Nature and of Geist in §380. While the lower stages of Nature are involved in the higher stages, the lower stages themselves can be thought as though they would exist in isolation: “The concrete nature of Geist involves for the observer the peculiar difficulty that the particular states [Stufen] and determinations of the development of its concept do not also remain behind as particular existences in contrast to its deeper formations. It is otherwise in external nature” (PM §380, 8). Hegel provides an example, citing matter and movement as existing both on their own and in the solar system, a higher stage of Nature. Nature is, therefore, distinct from Geist as concerns the discreteness of its stages. Hegel continues: “The determinations and stages of Geist, by contrast, are essentially only moments, states [Zustände], determinations in the highest stages of development [den hören Entwicklungsstufen]. As a consequence of this, a lower and more abstract determination of the Geist reveals the presence in it, even empirically, of a higher phase” (ibid.). Part of this issue concerns a methodological reflection that Hegel is offering for us: a higher stage of Geist is irreducible to a lower stage, but a lower stage might require looking ahead to a higher stage of development. Generally, we want to emphasize how this difference between stages indicates different levels of complexity, rather than fundamentally distinct and discrete entities.

Additionally, what Hegel is explaining in §380 is that something such as sensation [Empfindung], feeling [Gefühl], or intuition [Anschauung], for example, does not have a particular existence in abstention of the more developed concept of Geist of which it is a non-isolable, integrated feature; nor are these moments of a progressive process of natural development; the stages of Geist have no particular existence except through Geist’s full actualization. Moreover, these moments of the intelligence are all forms of mental activity, none of which are isolatable as discrete faculties. Hegel is decisively critical of anatomical dissections of the “mind,” so we must be careful not to think of these mental activities, as separate states. This puts Hegel in stark contrast to the contemporary materialist who claims that mental states can be physiologically isolated, defined, and quite literally pointed to. In what follows, we will explore Hegel’s account of intuition with a specific emphasis on time in order to both set up a contrast between his view and Kant’s, and to establish the ontological upshot of Hegel’s position.

2.1 Feeling, Attention, Intuition

Far from being simply a faculty, intuition is, for Hegel, a conceptualization of an aspect of our mental activity that provides the preliminary part of an account of how it is that we know. Although intuition is not fully developed knowledge on its own, but rather precedes it (because immediate knowledge ought to become the mediated knowledge of rational thinking), Hegel’s account of intuition is fundamental to his own philosophy because it grounds knowledge in the knowable reality, or being, of the empirical. This is because intuition is the activity of positing and apprehending a spatio-temporal object. The ability to make things conceptually meaningful
belongs exclusively to Geist, but if the concepts we develop do not follow directly from empirical reality, or are at odds with it, then Hegel’s epistemology becomes a transcendental idealism, or, equally problematically, a subjective idealism. Consequently, it is important to be clear on the type of empirical realism that Hegel espouses with his account of intuition.

Hegel’s account of intuition in the “Psychology” is divided into three parts: (i) feeling [Gefühl], (ii) attention [Aufmerksamkeit], and (iii) intuition proper. As the synthesis of the content of the “Anthropology” and “Phenomenology,” the first moment of feeling has the form of being a determinate affection [eine bestimmte Affektion], and the content of this affection is both subjective and objective. The absence of one-sidedness in the content is precisely why feeling in the “Psychology” is not the same feeling described in the “Anthropology” qua immediate embodiment. Furthermore, that the object of feeling is not merely a form of subjective experience is because the preceding arguments of the Geistesphilosophie have shown there to be no mind-world or mind-body dualism:

For what the intelligence seems to receive from outside is, in truth, none other than the rational and is consequently identical with Geist and immanent in it. The activity of Geist has, therefore, no other aim than, by sublation of the ostensible being-external-to-its-own-self of the implicitly rational object, to refute even the semblance of the object’s externality to Geist. (PM §447A, 178)

The empirical—what the “intelligence seems to receive from the outside”—has the intrinsic form of rationality in exactly the same manner as Geist as intelligence does, but just not immediately. The implicit rationality of the content requires development, and this is what the account of the intelligence provides. When the object of our feeling affects the intelligence, it does so because the form of feeling itself is capable of being affected, that is, the empirical content of sensation impacts the intelligence immediately through the senses, without yet engaging the activities of intelligence. As Hegel says, to feel something is to “find” it and, emphatically, not to make it (PM §446 & §448). That the content is found, as opposed to created or constructed, is crucial because it lends justification to the idea that the Geistesphilosophie provides a non-transcendental account of subjectivity. However, it is far from sufficient that we should be merely impacted by empirical objects since, qua feeling, no distinction is developed such that the rationality of the content can be posited for the intelligence. What is needed is a distinguishing activity whereby the immediate, affective content of feeling is apprehended.

Due to the implicit rationality of the content of feeling, this content cannot simply affect the intelligence—it must become for it; and this is accomplished in what Hegel calls attention: “Without attention, therefore, no apprehension of the object [Objektes] is possible; only by attention does Geist become present in the subject-matter [der Sache] and obtain cognizance of it, though not as yet cognition of the subject-matter, for this requires a further development of Geist” (PM §448A, 179). What attention accomplishes is the breaking up of the immediate relation to the object in feeling so that the content becomes present to the intelligence, and this establishes a ground for the actual appropriation of the object, which is later accomplished in recollection [Erinnerung].
Generally put, the move from the immediacy of feeling to intuition marks a transformation of both form and content such that what was immediately sensed becomes an object that is present for the intelligence. The forms of feeling, attention, and intuition are not forms of different contents, but different forms of *one and the same* content, which changes with respect to the form with which it is apprehended. In other words, both form and content are involved in a mutually implicating process of becoming such that the more complex the subjective form of apprehension of an object, then the more complex the objectivity of the content. Hegel makes this point explicitly with respect to intuition in §448A:

The activity of intuition initially produces in general a shifting of sensation away from us, a transformation of what is sensed into an object present outside us. The *content* of sensation is not altered by this alteration; on the contrary, it is here still one and the same content in *Geist* and in the external object, so that *Geist* here still has no content peculiar to itself which it could compare with the content of intuition. Consequently, what comes about by intuition is merely the transformation of the form of *internality* into the form of *externality*. (PM §448A, 181)

Thus, there is a mutual transformation of both form and content in intuition, as it is a more a complex cognitive mode. And because the new form of apprehension is that of *externality*, which is the form of Nature considered first in the transition from Logic to Nature, it follows that the immediate forms of the external as such, that is, space and time, have applicability to the object *equally* as it is for the intelligence, or “for us,” *and* as such, or “in itself.” So it is not surprising that, in PM §448A, Hegel states that sensation *becomes* both spatial and temporal in intuition, and those forms can only *become* as such because the content itself has the form of externality, rather than the spatio-temporal being exclusively a subjective form of mental activity. Therefore, intuition is the activity of the positing and apprehension of a spatio-temporal object.

At first glance, in claiming that intuition determines the content according to the forms of space and time because they are the primary forms of intuition, it may appear as though Hegel is adopting the Kantian view of intuition—but this would reduce the reality of the empirical to the experience of the subject. As noted above, it is important that Hegel give cognition an empirical basis, but not merely as the knowledge of appearances or our experiences of them such that the entire account of knowing itself would be reduced to the primacy of the subject, leaving us unable to say much about reality as it is. In other words, it is important that Hegel’s idealism *not* be a *subjective* idealism, so it is essential that he distinguish himself from Kant concerning this issue insofar as it arises with respect to spatio-temporal intuition (PM §448A). However, before engaging with Hegel’s criticism of Kant’s view, and how those criticisms inform our understanding of the relation between subjectivity and time, we need to have a clear idea of Kant’s account of intuition.

### 2.2 Space, Time, and Intuition in Kant’s first *Critique*

Kant’s claim that space and time are pure forms of sensibility is historically situated as a resolution to a prior debate between the Newtonian view of the absoluteness of space and time as substantial entities in their own right, and the Leibnizian view that space and time are abstract
relational structures. The forms of space and time are also foundational for Kant’s epistemology and the project of his transcendental idealism. For Kant, space and time, as subjective forms of experience, tell us nothing about being as such—that is, they have no ontological significance, as they do for Hegel. Hence, for Kant, they are the conditions of the possibility of the experience of any object whatsoever and they are, thus, merely subjective—that is, one-sided—determinations. For that reason, it is commonplace to refer to Kant’s idealism as subjective, which Hegel does. This is significant because time, whether in intuition or conceptually, is no mere subjective determination for Hegel, and although it is not one-sided in this way, it does significantly inform the Hegelian approach to subjectivity. It is necessary, then, to develop Kant’s account of intuition in order to show how Hegel incorporates it in such a way that does not undermine his account of subjectivity.

Kant famously advances his epistemological view of space and time in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The basics of his account are developed in the “Transcendental Aesthetic,” wherein he presents the following theses about time: (1) time is a pure form of sensible intuition; and, (2) time is empirically real and transcendentally ideal. Although much more could be said about time for Kant, these views will aid our capacity to frame Hegel’s Kant, particularly concerning the matter of Hegel’s account of intuition and the sense of time appropriate to it.

After introducing the project of the *Critique of Pure Reason* as an investigation into the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments, Kant provides the foundation for his account of cognition in the “The Transcendental Aesthetic.” The manner in which objects are first given to cognition occurs in what Kant labels sensibility [*Sinnlichkeit*], which is a passive faculty for receptivity. It is only after being given to sensibility that an object becomes an intuition [*Anschauung*], and is later a thought in the Kantian sense of the division of these terms. Ultimately the importance of sensibility for Kant is profound, for without objects being given to sensibility, there would be no objects given to us at all (CPR, 172).

Understanding the capacity of sensibility, as Kant develops it, depends on further terminological considerations, some of which correspond to Hegel’s language in Subjective Geist. According to Kant, when an object affects us, this is sensation [*Empfindung*], and intuitions about objects of sensation are called empirical intuitions. Kant qualifies these intuitions as empirical in order to engender the distinction between empirical and pure intuitions, the latter providing the ordering form to sensation. The idea of a pure intuition is not an arbitrary assertion for Kant, but follows from his analysis of the sensible. He argues:

> “Since that within which the sensations can alone be ordered and placed in a certain form cannot itself be in turn sensation, the matter [*Materie*] of all appearance is only given to us *a posteriori*, but its form must all lie ready for it in the mind *a priori*, and can therefore be considered separately from all sensation.” (CPR, 173)

Because objects of sensation cannot be self-ordering and self-explaining, there must be some aspect of cognition that orders the sensorial givens such that the objects of sensation can be cognizable at all; and if all sensation is first experienced as appearance *a posteriori*, then the...
ordering form must be a priori. Kant famously refers to this a priori condition of sensibility in general as the pure forms of sensible intuition of space and time.

For Kant, space and time denote two forms of sense with respect to the subject of which sensibility is the faculty of receptivity:

By means of outer sense (a property of our mind) we represent to ourselves objects as outside us, and all as in space…Inner sense, by means of which the mind intuits itself, or its inner state, gives, to be sure, no intuition of the soul itself, as an object; yet it is still a determinable form, under which the intuition of its inner state is alone possible, so that everything that belongs to the inner determination is represented in relations of time. Time can no more be intuited externally than space can be intuited as something in us. (CPR, 174)

The inner/outer sense distinction is significant for Kant because it furnishes the ground for our experiences of objects as external to us, and those experiences—or rather the conditions of possibility for those experiences—differ from those of inner sense, which Kant explains with the pure intuition of time as the sense of both the self and temporal sequences.

The “Transcendental Aesthetic” first considers space as the condition for the possibility of our experience of things as external to us. Space is not apprehended a posteriori from experience, but makes the experiences we have of outer appearances possible a priori. Hence, Kant concludes, “Space is a necessary representation, a priori, that is the ground of all outer intuitions,” and, he continues, “[i]t is therefore to be regarded as the condition of the possibility of appearances, not as a determination dependent on them, and is an a priori representation that necessarily grounds outer appearances” (CPR, 175). Because space is a pure intuition, it is neither a substantial entity in its own right, a property of things, nor is it a concept. Ultimately, the insights Kant gleans into the intuition of space, as he does with time, tell us quite a bit about our “human standpoint,” but very little about being as such.14

The exposition of time as a pure intuition follows closely from that of space, and the two together exhaust the ground for the possibility of appearance in general. As it is with space, Kant argues that we do not have an empirical experience of time, as if pure succession or simultaneity were given as a posteriori phenomena. However, the pure intuition of time has superiority to that of space in that Kant links it with the experience of the self. This is in part what Kant means when he refers to it as a form of inner sense (CPR, 180).

One of the central conclusions of the “Transcendental Aesthetic” is that space and time are empirically real and transcendently ideal. For Kant the objectivity of time is dependent on the experience of appearances, so time is not objective with respect to things themselves. This is one way to frame the empirical reality and transcendental ideality of time. Concerning the former, time has empirical reality with respect to our experience of objects of sensation; this is the empirical reality of time. Kant claims that we cannot apply this empirical reality to a notion of absolute reality due to the transcendental ideality of time: that time is nothing outside of the subject (CPR, 181). In both considerations, the assertion that time has no status independently of
a mind is fundamental and this amounts to making objectivity both derivative to subjectivity and dependent upon it (CPR, 181).

Following Kant’s account we are unable to make ontological conclusions about the relation of time to being, or the status of time as being qua becoming. However, following the approach to time in the Naturphilosophie, Hegel does allow for an ontology of the concept of time. Because we are now dealing with how Kant and Hegel present their accounts of time in intuition, the question must be posed: How Kantian is Hegel’s account of intuition? Or, to put the question more precisely, is Hegel’s account of intuition in the “Psychology” transcendental? The critical position Hegel takes with respect to Kant concerning spatio-temporal intuition needs to be framed accordingly and made explicit.

2.3. Hegel’s Critique of Kantian Spatio-Temporal Intuition

Given that one of the primary elements of Kant’s epistemology, as developed in the Critique of Pure Reason, is his account of the pure intuitions of space and time, it is noteworthy that Hegel makes no reference to Kant in the primary content paragraphs of his own account of intuition from the “Psychology.” As Scott Jenkins (2010) has remarked, it is a challenge to pinpoint a direct response to Kant’s arguments about intuition in Hegel’s works. In the Naturphilosophie, however, we locate an indirect reflection concerning intuition and Kant in the highly important place wherein Hegel deals with time qua becoming (PN §258R). There, Hegel states:

Time, like space, is a pure form of sense [Sinnlichkeit] or intuition [Anschauens], the non-sensuous sensuous; but, as in the case of space, the distinction of objectivity and a subjective consciousness confronting it, does not apply to time. If these determinations were applied to space and time, the former would then be abstract objectivity, the latter abstract subjectivity. (PN §258R, 34-35)

In describing time as a form of intuition, Hegel is evoking Kant, albeit without explicitly referring to him by name. This passage is very helpful for framing how we approach the question of Hegel’s adoption of Kantian intuition and the relevance of time because it makes an important claim with reference to the content of the Geistesphilosophie: time should not be approached dualistically in terms of the subject-object distinction for consciousness, which is the essential distinction underlying the phenomenology of consciousness from the Geistesphilosophie. This particular issue is important because it raises the question of the difference between the account of intuition and the phenomenology of sense-consciousness, which are two different stages of the development of Geist differing in degrees of complexity.

The 1830 Encyclopedia’s section “Phenomenology” is the mediating stage between “Anthropology” and “Psychology”; it provides the necessary presupposition of the “I” of universal reason that makes the account of the “Psychology” possible as an ontology of the structure of human subjectivity. Setting aside the relationship between the Jena Phenomenology of 1807 and the later, mature Berlin version, the Encyclopedia’s “Phenomenology” has the tripartite division of consciousness as such, self-consciousness, and reason. It is under the first of these divisions that Hegel addresses sensory consciousness and makes reference to time such that
we can make sense of why Hegel claims in the *Naturphilosophie* that time is not the proper object of phenomenology, or, more generally, of a dualistic philosophical approach.

In the *Encyclopedia*’s “Phenomenology,” consciousness as such is first the immediate relation between subject and object; this, for Hegel, is sensory consciousness. Hegel then states that the question of whether or not the object of the immediate relation of sensory consciousness is spatio-temporal belongs to an account of intuition: "Spatial and temporal individuality, the *here* and the *now*, as I have determined the object of sensory consciousness in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, strictly belongs to intuition” (PM §418R, 147). The ability for consciousness to claim that it has an object that is *here* and *now*, which is the fundamental element of the argument against immediate knowledge in the 1807 *Phenomenology*, is here revoked. Instead, in asserting that the spatio-temporality of the object is accounted for by intuition, Hegel is referring ahead to the “Psychology,” wherein he continues to develop the Phenomenology-Psychology distinction, or, between the oppositional nature of *Verstand* and the more comprehensive *Vernunft*. Consequently, how we should approach the intuition of time is part of what Hegel is addressing in §258R of the *Naturphilosophie* where he repudiates a phenomenology of time while simultaneously referring to Kantian intuition. Naturally, then, we would expect direct reference to Kant in the content paragraphs of the “Psychology,” or the remarks about them, in which Hegel treats intuition, since this would complete the allusion made in PN §258R. The discussion of Kant appears, however, in an addition, and therefore is something Hegel lectured about.

One way to resolve the issue is to say that both Kant and Hegel are more or less talking past each other because both philosophies are responding to different questions. Hegel himself framed the issue that way in his lectures on Kant: “But what the nature of time and space is, it does not occur to the Kantian philosophy to inquire. To it what space and time are in themselves does not signify ‘what is their Concept,’ but ‘Are they external things or something in the mind?’” (LHP, 436). The difference Hegel is largely illustrating here is between ontology and epistemology. He suggests that the Kantian focus on the knowledge of either mind dependent or independent entities does not respond to the question of the concept of something, as Hegel’s own philosophical standpoint does.

Setting aside this difference in standpoints, since this issue is far too broad to resolve here, the indebtedness, or lack thereof, of Hegel to Kant on intuition and time can be addressed in two ways. First, we take Hegel to be following in the post-Kantian critical tradition of Solomon Maimon by arguing that space and time are not pure, but *empirical* intuitions. As such, time acquires a conceptual basis that affords no special priority to the one-sided view of subjectivity. Second, Hegel frames the real-ideal distinction in terms of the unity of form and content, so it is inappropriate to conceive spatio-temporal intuition dichotomously as empirically real and transcendentally ideal, as Kant does.

Hegel’s most direct reflection in the “Psychology” on the Kantian account of intuition occurs in §448A, where, in the primary content paragraph, Hegel appears to be advocating some version of Kant’s view. Hegel, however, directly confronts the status of Kantian intuition in the addition, where we read:
When we said that what is sensed receives from the *intuiting Geist* the form of the spatial and temporal, this statement must not be understood to mean that space and time are only subjective forms. This is what Kant wanted to make space and time. However, things [*die Dinge*] are in truth *themselves* spatial and temporal; this double form of extrinsicality [*Außereinander*] is not one-sidedly imposed on them by our intuition, it has already been originally imparted to them by the infinite *Geist* that is in itself, by the creative eternal Idea. (PM §448, 181, translation modified)

Although one might want to object and say that Hegel’s appeal to the “Idea” here does not constitute an argument, it is in fact making an explicit reference to the transition in his philosophical science from Logic to Nature, and as such amounts to a rigorous systematic argument. The move from Logic to Nature determines Nature first as the external, and space and time are first forms of externality. Therefore, it is not because space and time are subjective forms that they have applicability to the empirical objects of intuitive experience, but rather space and time are determinations of Nature whose form of externality establishes the objectivity of time. Consequently, the issue, and the essence of the upshot of Hegel’s position here, is the challenge to the subjective exclusivity of the intuition of time, which we find in Kant.

Furthermore, Hegel is also challenging the status of time as an a priori intuition. According to Kant, empirical intuitions are those for which sensory objects are present (CPR, 193). Following Hegel’s account, sensation is everywhere directly involved in intuition due to the empirical foundation of the immediacy of feeling. So insofar as we speak of time as intuitive form, for Hegel, we must do so as an empirical intuition because time is both an objective determination of Nature and a subjective concept of the intelligence. Even those who would argue that Hegel’s *Naturphilosophie* is aprioristic, can at the very least grant, as Willem deVries (1988) does, that Hegel’s account of intuition is indicative of a “healthy realism.”

Despite the fact that Hegel is not engaged in a transcendental account of cognition, Hegel’s position on the matter is comparable to that of Maimon’s critical stance toward Kant on space and time. Maimon largely advances the Kantian critical project, but criticizes the status of time and space as *pure* intuitions. Maimon (2010) claims space and time are empirical intuitions because they are predicates of intuitions, which give them a conceptual basis and elevates them from merely the level of intuition to the understanding (ETP, 18). This was Maimon’s attempt to bridge the divide between sensible particulars and categorical thought, which, according to post-Kantian criticism, Kant’s philosophy leaves disjunctively unexplained. Evidence that Hegel also viewed time as an empirical intuition can be found as early as the 1801 *Differenz* essay, where, despite his obvious status as a supporter of Schelling’s philosophy at that time, Hegel states the intuition of time is empirical (Werke 2:44). However, Hegel’s mature philosophy is not transcendental, and so Hegel differs in many respects from Maimon’s own attempt at a post-Kantian corrective transcendental philosophy, not to mention that Hegel neither continued to be a transcendental Schellingian after the 1807 *Phenomenology*. In sum, Hegel challenges the transcendental status of time advanced by Kant, initially by providing a conceptual account of time in the *Naturphilosophie*. In the *Geistesphilosophie*, we
then see how that account fits with an approach to spatio-temporal intuition that is grounded in sensory being.

3. Conclusion

We have aimed to show that Hegel’s debt and appropriation of Kant’s account of intuition amounts to a rejection of transcendentalism. When speaking of an intuition of time we are developing an ontologically significant claim that cannot be restricted to the questions of epistemology, that is, the limitations of knowledge with respect to mind dependent or independent entities. For Hegel, both the subjective aspect of the content as form and the objective determination of the object itself cannot be separated in intuition because there is no fundamental ontological distinction between form and content. Even if we conceive the real as the sensible material \([\text{Stoff}]\) that has the form of space and time, there is no significant ontological distinction between the object of intelligence and intelligence itself qua self-determining subjectivity, or reason. Insofar as space and time apply as forms of the content in general, this spatio-temporal form is equally subjective and objective. In other words, neither the form nor the objects are merely mental contents. Kant is a subjective idealist insofar as we are talking about intuition because the forms of subjective experience, which order the empirical sense data, determine the contents of intuition.\(^{19}\) So both form and content belong to the side of the subject, thus constituting Kant’s subjective idealism. For Hegel, the subject is not the legislator of appearances, but precisely that which \(\text{becomes}\) objective and one instance of this is the apprehension of time as a structural component inherent of being in \(\text{intuition}\). Ultimately, Hegel’s account of intuition evidences a connection between an ontological conceptualization of subjectivity and the intuition of time, which both portrays a non-transcendental Hegelian metaphysics and highlights the complexity and revision of the concept of intuition in German Idealism more generally.

Notes

1. The Encyclopedia was Hegel’s manual for teaching his philosophy to his students. It is a dense text composed of numbered paragraphs that are organized according to their systematic exposition. In some cases Hegel includes a remark to the primary paragraph, which serves to further elucidate its meaning. These are Hegel’s own inclusions. Moreover, we have access to the notes taken by Hegel’s students during his lectures; these are published along with the Encyclopedia as additions to the primary content paragraphs. When we cite from Hegel’s Encyclopedia, we make note of whether or not we are referring to a remark or an addition by including ‘R’ or ‘A’ in the paragraph reference.

2. Rather than using a substantive, Terry Pinkard suggests translating Geist as “mindedness.” Because this term is in line with a deflationary, non-metaphysical reading of Hegel’s philosophy, we do not think it is the appropriate English translation.

3. English readers of Hegel must be careful not to confuse the intelligence with the intellect, which is sometimes employed as a translation of Verstand instead of the understanding.

4. Hegel first announces this division of the “Theoretical Psychology” in EL §2 by claiming that
they are each forms of human consciousness that differ in form from thinking as such. It is odd, however, that he distinguishes feeling [Gefühl] along with intuition and representation, whereas in the “Psychology” feeling is the immediate moment of intuition. The oddity of this exception afforded to feeling disappears when we recognize that Hegel is commenting on the significance of thinking for humans, as opposed to animals, and more specifically the type of thinking proper to philosophy. Both animals and humans share sensation [Empfindung], but feeling is a form proper to human beings. Much could be said about the distinction between feeling and sensation, i.e., between Gefühl and Empfindung. We will restrict ourselves to highlighting two noteworthy interpretations. In “How the Dreaming Soul Became the Feeling Soul,” Jeffrey Reid (2013) demonstrates that between the 1827 and 1830 version of the Encyclopedia Hegel revised sections of the “Anthropology” to substitute Gefühl for Empfindung in order to challenge the religion of feeling espoused by Schleiermacher. Furthermore, Reid points out that while the 1827 Encyclopedia makes no distinction between Gefühl and Empfindung, the 1830 edition does so explicitly. According to Reid’s analysis, the intention behind Hegel’s increased emphasis on feeling between the 1827 and 1830 editions of the “Anthropology” is to show the pathological nature of Schleiermacher’s religion of feeling. Another possibility concerning the difference between feeling and sensation is that Gefühl is a spiritualized form of Empfindung involving some conception of the self, which is what Willem deVries (1988) argues in Hegel’s Theory of Mental Activity. Thus, because humans have a more developed form of self than animals, according to Hegel, that is perhaps why he singles out feeling in EL §2.

5. Hegel earlier describes Nature in terms of a system of stages [System von Stufen] in the introduction to the Naturphilosophie, which is the second volume of the Encyclopedia.

6. “In sensation [Empfindung], for example, we can find all the higher phases of the mind as its content or determinacy. And so sensation, which is just an abstract form, may to the superficial glance seem to be the essential seat and even the root of that higher content, the religious, the ethical, and so on; and it may seem necessary to consider the determinations of this content as particular species of sensation. But all the same, when lower stages are under consideration, it becomes necessary, in order to draw attention to them in their empirical existence, to refer to higher stages in which they are present only as forms. In this way we need at times to introduce, by anticipation, a content which presents itself only later in the development” (PM §380).

7. Further confirmation of this can be located in the preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, where Hegel writes that philosophical science ought not to dissect parts of the whole and treat them as inanimately isolated, as is done in the particular science of anatomy. See Werke (3: 11).

8. Bernard Mabille (2003, 103) explains the immediacy with which the “Psychology” opens as being the already mediated result of the “Phenomenology” and the “Psychology.” For that reason, the content of feeling presupposes the subject-object identity of what is rational, and, more significantly for our purposes here, Mabille claims the immediacy of the given in intuition is an immediacy that has become via the preceding stages of Subjective Geist. In other words, it is a spiritualized immediacy.

9. “In the mind the content of feeling is liberated from the two-fold one-sidedness which it had, on the one hand, at the standpoint of soul and, on the other hand, at the standpoint of consciousness. For this content now has the determination of being in itself both subjective and objective; and Geist’s activity now aims only at positing the content as a unity of the subjective and objectivity”
10. That Hegel takes the sensible quite seriously in his Geistesphilosophie is very important to his project therein, and, as John Burbidge (2005) has argued, to the relation of Logic and Geist. Concerning our approach to the “Psychology” in particular, the claim that Hegel believes that knowledge begins other than with sensation is untenable, e.g., in §11 of the Encyclopedia Hegel clearly states the content of feeling is the sensible [Sinnliches]. Although the empirical senses make the beginning, it does not end there. Also, his frequent criticisms of Jacobi and Schleiermacher have contributed to the view that Hegel devalues the cognitive importance and foundation of sensation. Concerning Hegel’s account of sensation [Empfindung], we refer to §400-§402 of the “Anthropology” and wish to highlight that Hegel considers the various sense faculties of human beings to be unconscious processes; for example, while we are non-conscious of the various neural impulses that are involved in sensory input, our mental activity fashions objects of sense into rational objects that we are aware of and that are for us. A Geistesphilosophie will provide an account of concepts that are meaningful for us; and a particular domain of the hard sciences will provide an account of how the senses physically operate. In this way Hegel is not opposed to modern developments in knowledge about the body and its functions. However, it is simply not the task of a speculative philosophy to deliver an account of such specific phenomenon anymore than it is the task of a speculative Naturphilosophie to provide a categorical sequence of species-to-species evolution.

11. For a survey of this debate, we suggest the Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, edited by H.G. Alexander (1956).

12. Although the Kritik der reinen Vernunft was first published in 1781, our emphasis is the 1787 revised B edition.

13. While our focus is “The Transcendental Aesthetic,” we acknowledge that a full exposition of Kant’s account of time would also have to consider “The Transcendental Analytic,” “The Transcendental Deduction,” and the “Schematism.”

14. “We can accordingly space of space, extended beings, and so on, only from the human standpoint. If we depart from the subjective condition under which alone we can acquire outer intuition, namely that through which we may be affected by objects, then the representation of space signifies nothing at all” (CPR, 177).

15. In §258R of the Naturphilosophie Hegel makes it explicit that time is becoming, which is equally how he conceives being.

16. “With regard to the relationship of intuition to consciousness, the following remark must be made. In the broadest sense of the word, one could of course give the name of intuition to the immediate or sensory consciousness considered in §418. But if this name is to be taken in its proper significance, as rationally it must, then between this consciousness and intuition an essential distinction must be drawn: the former, in unmediated, entirely abstract certainty of itself, relates itself to the immediate individuality of the object, an individuality disintegrating into a multiplicity of aspects; whereas intuition is a consciousness filled by the certainty of reason, whose object has the determination of being something rational, consequently not an individual torn asunder into various aspects but a totality, a cohesive fullness of determinations” (PM §449A,
17. Our reading associates the relevance of space and time here to the concept of Nature, rather than because those are quantifiably pragmatic terms, as is recently suggested by Willem deVries (2013): “My guess is that space and time show up only here because Hegel thinks of them as precise and quantifiable, even metrical. Spatio-temporal determinations can be elaborated in endlessly precise ways and related to each other with mathematical precision. They are the rational elaboration of self-externality, so they make their appearance within subjective spirit only in its final, rational stage [Psychology], even if they appear as immediate determinacies” (150).

18. A similar project toward determining the foundations of critical philosophy was also undertaken by K.L. Reinhold.

19. According to Gilles Deleuze (1963), Kant makes the subject-object relation one of the relations of differing subjective faculties, which have a distinctly active role with respect to passive sensibility. Hegel’s views on space and time are rooted in an account of subjectivity that is very different from Kant’s, one that doesn’t treat the subjective as a mind divided into discrete faculties. Thus, Hegel’s account is arguably more robust than Kant’s formalistic spin on the Cartesian ‘I think’ for which Hegel claims Kant to be a subjective idealist. Thus, the difference between Hegel and Kant on the matter of spatio-temporal intuition can be conceived within the framework of alternate approaches to subjectivity. See Reid (2014), and Sedgwick (2012).

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Bibliography


Gnosis 15.1 | 2016


