Rawls from a different angle:
On the justice that makes (distributive) justice possible

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It is interesting that Karl Marx believed that a full communist society would be beyond justice. The (material) abundance that would exist in such a society, Marx seems to have thought, would allow it to function under the simple maxim “take what you want”. Whatever else such a maxim may be, it should be clear that it does not fall within the confines of what we would ordinarily want to call ‘justice’. Seeing that John Rawls mentions this aspect of Marx’s thought, one might be inclined to think that he agrees with it. (See: Rawls, 2001: 177) After all, Rawls’s conception of justice is specifically tailored for modern democratic societies in which “the circumstances of justice [do] exist,” and one of the more important of these is what Rawls calls “the objective circumstances of moderate scarcity.” (Rawls, 2001: 84. My emphasis.) If conditions of moderate scarcity were somehow to be overcome, however, couldn’t Rawls, in principle, agree with Marx on the possibility (for Marx it was an inevitability) of thereby transcending justice? Such a conclusion, I believe, would be both premature and, in the end, mistaken. To see exactly why, it will be necessary to recognize some of the consequences that Rawls wants to say follow from a recognition of that most significant of his/our “subjective circumstances of justice,” namely, “the fact of reasonable pluralism.” (Rawls, 2001: 84. My emphasis.) Rawls takes it as basic – and permanent – that “in modern democratic societ[ies] citizens affirm different, and indeed incommensurable and irreconcilable, though reasonable, comprehensive doctrines in the light of which they understand their conceptions of the good.” (Rawls, 2001: 84) Furthermore, and given “the history of democratic states [and also] the development of thought and culture in the context of free institutions,” Rawls thinks that it is evident that “there is no politically practicable

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1 To put some flesh on this idea, consider the following: if there were a limitless supply of transplant organs (say livers) would any of the ethical issues concerning whether we should give such organs to alcoholics or the very old have any of the urgency which they do today? It would seem not.
2 Is it a transcendence, or does it have more the character of a complete immanence? (Hegel’s pan-theism in Marx’s end of history?)
3 Exactly why it should be a reasonable pluralism is addressed in footnote 20.
way to eliminate [this] diversity except by the oppressive use of state power to establish a particular comprehensive doctrine and to silence dissent.” (Rawls, 2001: 84) So, and whereas a moderate scarcity of goods points to “the necessity of social co-operation [(most probably regulated by some principle(s) of distributive justice, like Rawls’s difference principle)] for all to have a decent standard of life,” the fact of reasonable pluralism reveals the need for toleration (and, ipso facto, the need for Rawls’s first principle of justice, that establishing the basic liberties).4 (Rawls, 2001: 84) Put differently, while a supra-abundance of goods might (and this is a very strong might – but let’s assume it for the sake of argument) allow one to go beyond justice, a concomitant abundance of comprehensive views concerning the good would (or, at least, could) keep one within it.5 After all, such plurality spells out the need for the protection of the civil liberties, and the security of these (e.g. freedom of conscience and of thought) would presumably continue to be required even though conditions of (material) prosperity were such as to (purportedly) dissolve the need for distributive justice. Otherwise put, we can imagine6 the possibility of a society that, although blessed with a supra-abundance of goods, would still need another - in this case, non-distributive - form of justice to ensure the safety of the civil liberties of its members (this, due to the plurality of comprehensive views existing amongst them). Otherwise, it would (probably) be an oppressive society, and, being oppressive, it would also be unlikely that it would, in turn, carry out the requirements of distributive justice the need for which had supposedly (and now we can see how falsely) been surpassed.7 To sum up, to move beyond justice, on Rawls’s take, two conditions would have to be satisfied: first, there would have to be an abundance of goods; and second, there would need to be a paucity – indeed a unity – of comprehensive conceptions of the good. The first

4 This correlation between Rawls’s first principle of justice (that establishing the basic liberties) and the fact of pluralism, as well as the connection between (especially) the second half of his second principle of justice (the difference principle) and conditions of moderate scarcity is, I think, suggestive and illuminating. It would nevertheless be wrong to conjecture from this that the two principles are fundamentally separate. As the main body of this text will hopefully make clear, Rawls does not think that the second principle could ever be (safely) fulfilled unless the first one was already in place. This, I suppose, is part of the “lexical priority” of the first principle of justice. (See: Rawls, 2001: 43)

5 This is a crucial asymmetry.

6 Perhaps we need not imagine it. It sounds eerily familiar to our world.

7 Certain groups might, for instance, be systematically excluded from the distribution due to their differing convictions. And this, despite their living in the midst of abundance. (Here, I can’t help but think of the fable of the hen and the seed, and, as G. A. Cohen once asked me, whether it is a communist or a fascist fable.)
condition might conceivably, through the development of productive forces, manage to be fulfilled. But the second – unless it were already a fortunate matter of fact – could not be brought about except by means of illegitimate force. ‘Unfortunately’, and since the contingency we live in does include a plurality of conceptions of the good, it follows that the transition to a point outside justice cannot, for us, (ever) legitimately occur. A world of plenty, then – and on Rawls’s conception – is not on its own enough to undermine the need for justice.

The above discussion sheds light on just why, according to Rawls, “the evanescence of justice, even of distributive justice, is not possible, nor... desirable.” (Rawls, 2001: 177) It also brings to the surface what’s wrong with those who, like Iris Marion Young, think Rawls focuses only on distributive justice without paying attention to the background conditions (of justice!) which must hold if distributions are in actuality going to turn out being fair. (See: Young, 1990) But Rawls isn’t entirely off the hook yet. Some, for example Jean Hampton, think that Rawls’s emphasis on pluralism and the need for toleration encapsulates a mere modus vivendi. (See: Hampton, 1989) Rawls, on this take, does not manage to give a moral basis to the need for toleration. If this is correct – and given that justice falls within the scope of the moral – then Rawls

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8 We might want to ask ourselves whether it would really be fortunate. A closer inspection could give us reason to fear that it would, to the contrary, be bland and onerous. (For arguments to that effect see Brian Barry’s “An Interview With Professor Brian Barry,” in Cogito, vol. 13, no. 2 (1999): 81, and Rawls’s “Fairness to Goodness,” in his Collected Papers, ed. Samuel Freeman (Cambridge, Mass., 2001: 281).

9 I put ‘ever’ in brackets in recognition of the slight chance that a social movement might sweep over the land, (peacefully) converting all to its cause - without the help of state power. Something like that happened in India with Buddhism from the 5th century B.C. E till the reign of Ashoka in the 3rd century B. C. E. And similar things have happened elsewhere. Of course, they all had a terminus, and the consensi achieved were never entirely complete. Still, this ‘hope’ needs to be mentioned, even if one doesn’t place much store on it. Rawls certainly doesn’t seem to. (Marx neither. As is well-known – and like Georges Sorel – Marx thought violence and conflict would be the norm in the transition from capitalist to communist times.)

10 Incidentally, it also helps explain why, as Rawls points out in a footnote, Marx thought a role for “the rights of man” would disappear under full communism: if the evanescence of justice in a completely communist society requires that there be only one comprehensive view of the good, then there need be no protection of liberty of conscience. Perhaps we could caricaturise it this way: in a communist utopia it may be true that we no longer be merely formally equal, but in such a place our liberty of conscience would become so (i.e. it would be, at most, merely formal and never material or actualisable). So stated, there seems to be something substantive in the old debate pitting liberty vs. equality. An end to civil liberties – and not just that of the right to own private property – may be part of Marx’s logic. (For Rawls’s footnote, see his Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge, Mass., 2001: 177fn). For Marx’s distinction between the rights of man and the political liberties see his “On the Jewish Question,” in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York, 1978). Pages 40-46 are especially relevant.)

11 Young’s statement: “what marks [Rawls’s] distributive paradigm is a tendency to conceive social justice and distribution as coextensive concepts” is a perfect illustration of this form of misinterpretation. (Young, 1990: 16) Rawls, as we have just seen, does not make such an identification/reduction.
may not, despite all we have just said, be able to dismiss Marx so easily. This is because, granting this view, the civil liberties would have less (if anything at all) to do with justice, and more the character of political instruments used solely to maintain order. It is crucial, then, for Rawls to show how his emphasis on toleration (again, resulting from the fact of entrenched pluralism) is not only instrumental but also moral.

The way Rawls goes about doing this is both novel and complex. In large part, this novelty and complexity is a result of his having to be careful in order to follow what he calls his “method of avoidance.” (Rawls, 2001d: 395) This is a manner of ‘travelling philosophically light’ that results from his extension of “the principle of toleration to philosophy itself.” (Rawls, 2001d: 388. My emphasis.) Let me elucidate.

Rawls, like Thomas Hobbes, is concerned with stability; but – and unlike Hobbes he wants “stability for the right reasons.” (Rawls, 2001b: 589. My emphasis.) What Rawls is referring to here is his need to find a moral justification for the basic structure or the constitutional essentials of liberal democracies. Amongst other things, this justification would provide a principled basis to the basic liberties safeguarded in those regimes. What, then, are Rawls’s ‘right reasons’? Well, to start – and (once more) given the fact of reasonable pluralism – Rawls thinks that they can’t be reasons that come (entirely) from one or another comprehensive doctrine of the good – be it religious or secular.12 Why not? Partly because such a basis would “fail to be properly tolerant of the diversity of ideas and practices in our political culture;” but also, and not unrelatedly, because Rawls is firmly convinced that reasons proffered from such (expansive) standpoints would inevitably be controversial and, ultimately, divisive. (Hampton, 1989: 803) This last is so, not only because of the numerous conflicting comprehensive views already found in our democratic societies, but also due to what Rawls names “the burdens of judgment.” (See: Rawls, 2001: 35-37) These are “the many obstacles to the correct (and conscientious) exercise of our powers of reason and judgment in the ordinary course of political life.” (Rawls, 2001: 35) Familiar to most of us, they include the following:

(a) The evidence – empirical and scientific – bearing on a case may be conflicting and complex, and thus hard to assess and evaluate.

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12 Rawls defines “secular reasoning as reasoning in terms of comprehensive non-religious doctrines.” (Rawls, 2001b: 583) Utilitarianism, liberalism, libertarianism, communitarianism, etc., all fit into this definition. “Such [secular] doctrines,” Rawls writes, “are much too broad to serve the purposes of public reason.” (Rawls, 2001b: 583) But now I’m running ahead of myself....
(b) Even where we agree fully about the kinds of consideration that are relevant, we may disagree about their weight, and so arrive at different judgments.

(c) To some degree all our concepts, and not only our moral and political concepts, are vague and subject to hard cases. This indeterminacy means that we must rely on judgment and interpretation (and on judgments about interpretations) within some range (not sharply specifiable) where reasonable persons may differ.

(d) The way we assess evidence and weigh moral and political values is shaped (how much we cannot tell) by our total experience, our whole course of life up to now; and our total experiences surely differ. So in a modern society with its numerous offices and positions, its many divisions of labor, its many social groups and often their ethnic variety, citizens’ total experiences differ enough for their judgments to diverge to some degree on many if not most cases of any significant complexity.

(e) Often there are different kinds of normative considerations of different force on both sides of a question and it is difficult to make an overall assessment. (Rawls, 2001: 35)

We can imagine more, but we have seen enough to realise that “many of our most important political judgments involving the basic political values are made subject to conditions such that it is highly unlikely that conscientious and fully reasonable persons, even after free and open discussion, can exercise their powers of reason so that all arrive at the same conclusion.” (Rawls, 2001: 36) But if all of this is the case, how – and where – can we expect to find Rawls’s right reasons? The answer, in brief, is that we find them “in the public political culture of a constitutional regime.” (Rawls, 2001b: 584)

According to Rawls, there are certain “fundamental ideas” in the public political culture of democratic societies that we can “elaborate” or “work up” into providing a principled justification for those societies’ underlying political structures. (Rawls, 2001c: 427) So, and “instead of looking to [comprehensive views and] philosophical doctrines that could be reasonably rejected in the light of the burdens of judgment,” Rawls seeks to “draw solely upon basic intuitive ideas that are embedded in the political institutions of a constitutional regime and the public traditions of their interpretation.” (Levine, 2002: 217; Rawls, 2001d: 340) Doing so, Rawls maintains, will allow him to come up with a “free-standing view”: a “political conception of justice” that presupposes no particular comprehensive doctrine. (Rawls, 2001: 190; Rawls, 2001d: 388. My emphasis.) Phrased differently, it will provide a political - as opposed to a comprehensive or metaphysical - liberalism. Does Rawls succeed in this? To respond to that question, we shall have to first look at his ‘fundamental intuitive ideas’.
Rawls singles out two such ideas as being especially important: 1) “society [seen] as a fair system of co-operation;” and 2) “the conceptions of citizens as free and equal persons.” (Rawls, 2001b: 584) For our purposes, we may focus only on the second one. It entails the uncontentious “idea that persons are morally [free and] equal in possessing capacities [(Rawls calls them “moral powers”)] for a sense of justice and for a conception of the good, and that people have capacities for judgment, thought and inference.” (Levine, 2002: 214) How is such an idea uncontentious? Well, and for one thing, it seems to unpack what is wrong in such universally (within liberal democracies) condemned practices as slavery and religious persecution.\(^{13}\) Religious persecution, for instance, doesn’t seem to respect the freedom that people have in forming, changing, and pursuing their own conceptions of the good, nor does it recognise the burdens of judgment (mentioned above) that make it likely that different persons shall want to hold alternative such conceptions. Slavery, for its part, evinces a complete lack of respect in one part of the citizenry in relation to the other, so much so that slaves become victims of a kind of “social death” and “are not recognised as persons at all” - let alone as citizens.\(^{14}\) (Rawls, 2001: 24) In other terms, slaves are not viewed as possessing moral capacities or ‘powers’ and, as a result, are not viewed “as self-authenticating sources of valid claims.” (Rawls, 2001: 23) This strikes us as unjust and arbitrary. Indeed, and as S. A. Lloyd aptly puts it, it clashes with the “public practice of our society [which] shows that we, its members, believe that citizenship ought not to depend on any non-technical qualification other than the possession of [the] moral powers to some essential minimum degree.” (Lloyd, 1994: 716. My rendition.) At bottom, then, it poses an affront to the consensus view in constitutional democracies that all human beings (and certainly citizens) deserve equal respect.

Notice what has just happened. Without relying on any comprehensive doctrines and staying squarely within the public political culture of liberal regimes, Rawls has managed to articulate shared values latent within them. One such value (for Rawls it is a “moral ideal”) is the conception of the person as possessed of the moral powers, moral powers that entitle him or her (unless certain technicalities – like being

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\(^{13}\) These are Rawls’s examples. He speaks of our “settled convictions [concerning] the belief in religious toleration and the rejection of slavery.” (Rawls, 2001d: 393)

\(^{14}\) For the idea of social death, Rawls refers to Orlando Patterson’s *Slavery and Social Death* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982). I haven’t read that book, but it sounds fascinating.
born in the wrong place – apply) to citizenship and whose (free) exercise is in each person’s fundamental interest. Since this conception of the person is derived entirely from within the public political culture, Rawls calls it a “political conception of the person.” (Rawls, 2001: 19) This serves to distinguish it from “thicker”, more controversial, views of the person that have their grounds in comprehensive doctrines. More important than this nomenclature, however, is how simply the move from this political conception of the person to Rawls’s first principle of justice can be made. Note that one need only reason from the public political conception of the person in order to realise the value of having the basic liberties – especially that of liberty of conscience – secured. And with that we have (finally!) arrived at Rawls’s right reasons: for Rawls, right reasons are public reasons that rely only on public political conceptions in order to reach their conclusions concerning what the basic structure of society should be like.\textsuperscript{15} (See: Rawls, 2001b) Lastly, and since such political conceptions are also clearly moral conceptions, we can conclude that Rawls is successful and that he does manage to show how his emphasis on toleration goes beyond the instrumental and reaches, via public reason, into the moral. As Rawls would put it: “The constitution is [not] honoured [merely] as a pact to maintain civil peace.” (Rawls, 2001b: 589. My rendition.)

But perhaps we have reached this conclusion too quickly. Hampton, for one, would deny it. How so? Hampton believes that, as a matter of fact, “there is no consensus on the idea that human beings deserve equal respect.” (Hampton, 1989: 813. My emphasis.) So, and if someone were to point out that this idea is “accepted by the intelligentsia all over the political spectrum from right, to center, to left, e.g. Nozick and Friedman as well as Dworkin and Rawls and Roemer and Cohen,” Hampton would want to gainsay it. (Nielsen, 1991: 84) She attempts to do so by pointing to the obvious truth that “racial discrimination, sexism, and exploitation” persist in our societies to this

\textsuperscript{15} It is useful to note that Rawls explicitly spells out three features of political conceptions:

- First, their principles apply to basic political and social institutions (the basic structure of society);

- Second, they can be presented independently from comprehensive doctrines of any kind (although they may, of course, be supported by a reasonable overlapping consensus of such doctrines); and

- Finally, they can be worked out from fundamental ideas seen as implicit in the public political culture of a constitutional regime, such as the conceptions of citizens as free and equal persons, and of society as a fair system of cooperation. (Rawls, 2001b: 584)

I hope this essay has shed some light on them.
day. (Hampton, 1989: 813) This, she contends, “betrays a commitment by many to the second-class status of some of their fellows.” (Hampton, 1989: 813) Hampton is surely right about this, but does that mean that we should allow her to work with it in the way she wants to? In Kai Nielsen’s words:

> these grossly unjust practices certainly exist in our societies, but they are no longer publicly defended, or at least much less frequently, and (where such defense occurs) more apologetically, more furtively, than before. There is, without doubt, racism but no one will defend racism (at least not in those terms). Similarly, no one will try to justify exploitation. At most it will be accepted as a necessary evil to avoid what is taken to be even worse evils. Sexism is all over the place. But few will defend it and the defences, such as they are, are more and more indirect, arcane and defensively apologetic. (Nielsen, 1991: 84. My emphasis.)

The endurance of biased practices, then, does not contravene Rawls. Rawls’s claim, after all, was just that the idea of the equal moral worth of persons was part of our public political culture. The fact that many people may not hold to this idea in private or instantitate it in their daily lives – though worrisome – does not undermine the equally factual public consensus that makes them ‘furtive’ and ‘apologetic’ when (or if) they try to bring their various forms of disrespect into the public forum. Rather, all it does is reveal how public conceptions can be vouchsafed in bad faith and that we may have more work cut out for us than merely writing out a constitution. We might, for instance, have to enforce the constitution. Such enforcement, though, would be legitimate since it would arise from “citizens’ power… impose[d] on themselves and on one another as free and equal.” (Rawls, 2001: 40)

Nonetheless, I do think that Hampton’s argument suggests another difficulty with Rawls’s view. This is that Rawls’s public reason may bestow too thin a foundation for a stable political regime. This amounts to a complete reversal of the previous criticisms encountered and states that whether or not Rawls’s political conception of justice is a moral one, it can’t be a modus vivendi. On this take, Rawls’s political liberalism is utopian.

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16 There are exceptions. Jean-Marie LePen, for one, was/is quite unapologetic. But once people in the French Republic took him seriously, he and his party were quickly and democratically voted out of positions from which they could have taken hold of the institutions of political power. There is a lesson to be learned in this.

17 In his article “Fairness to Goodness,” Rawls speaks of his project as providing a “thin theory of the good.” (Rawls, 2001e: 248)
Rawls would be very unhappy with this. Remember that – and contra someone like Hobbes who offers only prudential reasons – Rawls’s project was to give a moral justification to the foundations of constitutional democracies. This, in turn, was supposed to add to their stability. But the free-standing political/moral justification that Rawls provides, while it respects the plurality of comprehensive doctrines that exist in democratic societies, may nevertheless (and somewhat strangely) at the same time neglect the fact that people are not just citizens. They are also members of clubs, associations, various sorts of societies, churches, etc. Furthermore, and as Rawls himself recognises, it is in some such (or several such) organisation(s) that most people find their good and, even, seek the truth – not in the life of the public forum. (See: Rawls, 2001: 94)

Realising that it is in this “background culture,” and in the comprehensive doctrines of the good that may be being pursued in this background culture, that most people’s fundamental interests lie, one might start to question their allegiance to public reason and to the political conception(s) which Rawls hopes to make so much use of. (Rawls, 2001b: 576) In the face of such doubts – and avoiding the temptation of transforming his political conception into a kind of civic ideology – Rawls offers an additional inventive solution. Here, I refer to his notion of an “overlapping consensus.” (See: Rawls, 2001c)

There is a real sense in which Rawls hopes that his principles will be doubly (even triply) morally justified. They will be so justified, and as we have seen, in relation to values inherent in the public political culture, but they will also find a moral basis (Rawls argues) from within comprehensive doctrines of the good. As Rawls writes: “We hope to make it possible for all to accept the political conception as true, or as reasonable, from the standpoint of their own comprehensive view, whatever it may be.”

Rawls, then, believes that we can persuade, for example, “the Aristotelian, the Kantian, the Utilitarian, or the Christian, of the acceptability of his [(Rawls’s)] conception of justice in [their] own terms.” (Lloyd, 1994: 731) If we manage to do so, Rawls would say that we have shown how their views ‘overlap’ with the political conception of justice, and, if several enough of the comprehensive views found in a

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18 Lloyd (1994: 729) says that this quotation comes from Rawls’s paper “The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus,” but I haven’t been able to locate it there. I guess I’ll have to look harder.

19 Even if Rawls’s principles of justice can be given support from within comprehensive views, Rawls insists that “citizens are to reason by public reason… whenever constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice are at stake.” (Rawls, 2001b: 605) This, he states, is a “duty of civility.” (Rawls, 2001: 90)
democratic society overlap in this way, Rawls would go on to say that we have an overlapping consensus (this is the third way in which there would be moral justification) concerning the basic principles of justice. Finally – and this is the rub – a democratic society that was armed with such an overlapping consensus would in all likelihood be very stable. People’s endorsement of Rawls’s principles of justice would now have as part of its basis their deepest commitments. With that, however, has Rawls only succeeded in displacing his utopianism to another level?

I would argue not. Although many (e.g. Hampton, Barry, and Sheldon S. Wolin) have strong doubts concerning the viability of ever forging an overlapping consensus, there doesn’t seem to be any a priori reason why it shouldn’t occur. Present circumstances (especially mass, multi-cultural, immigration) may be complicating matters, but all that shows is that Rawls’s political liberalism, as well as the constitutional democracy that it supports, is - like any other political view/regime - an experiment. The experiment may fail; but if it succeeds, Rawls will have voiced the

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20 Interestingly enough – and somewhat tendentiously – Rawls wants to say that only comprehensive doctrines that have the resources within them to enter into an overlapping consensus are to be considered reasonable. One might take this to err on the side of narrowness, but it doesn’t. Rawls points to the fact that our comprehensive doctrines are often not all that systematic and complete. (See: Rawls, 2001: 193) He notes that “there is lots of slippage, so to speak, many ways for the political conception to cohere loosely with a (partially) comprehensive view, and many ways within the limits of a political conception to allow for the pursuit of different (partially) comprehensive doctrines.” (Rawls, 2001: 193) This lack of system, he says, “helps to permit a modus vivendi to change over time into an overlapping consensus.” (Rawls, 2001: 33) Reflecting on Western history since the Reformation (as Rawls himself often does), we could note the transformation within the Catholic Church – starting with the reactionary Council of Trent up to the liberal Vatican II – as a case in point. (If Rawls could base himself on controversial philosophical positions, he could also here conceivably make use of Quine’s attack on the analytic/synthetic distinction and his consequent insight into the malleability of our web(s) of belief.) Some narrowness does enter Rawls’s account of reasonableness, though, when one reads that the overlapping consensus need only “include all the opposing philosophical and religious doctrines likely to persist and to gain adherents in a more or less just constitutional democratic society.” (Rawls, 2001d: 390) What about views that won’t flourish? Is it because they are unreasonable? Rawls would answer, following Isaiah Berlin, that they need not be unreasonable (although some of them surely will be) but that they might just be unfortunate. There is no social world without loss: “any system of social institutions is limited in the range of values it can accommodate, so that some selection must be made from the full range of moral and political values that might be realized.” (Rawls, 2001: 36fn) Like any other social system, Rawls’s too will have a “limited social space.” (Rawls, 2001: 36) That should not be held against it.

21 For the view that “social institutions can be viewed as experiments in cooperation rather than as attempts to embody a universal and ahistorical order,” see Richard Rorty’s “The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy” in his Objectivity, Relativism and Truth (Cambridge, 1991). The quotation is from page 196 of that article. Also, I think it is worthwhile to mention that in periods in which there is a burgeoning of new views on things (perhaps because of immigration, or new communication technologies, or just an intellectual and artistic “boom”), liberal societies might experience a tendency towards reverting back to being a mere modus vivendi. This is because such new views require time to be, as it were, filtered into an
foundations of a political system more stable than Hobbes’s, one that – unlike Marx’s communism – will keep us somewhere on the balance of justice for a long time to come.

overlapping consensus. This is normal, but will be probably accompanied by feelings of angst (and, for some, excitement) in those living in the society.
Bibliography


