To confront the massive global resource inequality that characterizes the modern world is to confront a theoretical problem: Is such a distribution just? What is the nature and extent of our obligation to those disadvantaged by prevailing distributive institutions? Have we any obligations to them at all? While intuition alone points towards an affirmative answer to this last question – no one, after all, is *justly* disadvantaged by a system to which they did not consent and over which they have no control\(^1\) – the real challenge is the political institutionalization of this sense of indebtedness to the world’s poor. According to this line of thinking, global distributive institutions – most obviously, the market – must be modified so as to produce outcomes that guarantee a universal minimum living standard, however specified. One potential justification for such a system, in addition to the ones already mentioned, is a Kantian one: to be human is to be in possession of the basic moral capacities and, in turn, deserving of the opportunity to exercise said moral powers. This possibility is precluded to the vast majority of the world’s inhabitants in light of their poverty and the rectification of this fact is precisely the goal that motivates advocates of robust cosmopolitan redistribution.\(^2\) A contrary approach to global justice, however, says something like this: the idea of a global human community is an essentially empty one and is thus motivationally impotent. It is difficult to compel individuals to care about the plight of those with whom they share nothing in common, whether language, culture, politics, or historical experience. Instead, our focus must be on the internal justice of particular societies; that is, ensuring that a particular set of domestic institutions guarantee some kind of meaningful minimal standard of living. We may, on this account, have an obligation to assist in the design or repair of domestic institutions, but there is no direct obligation to the well-being of individuals.\(^3\) This latter obligation is fulfilled indirectly, through institutional reform. What is peculiar about this stance, however, is that advocates also regard it as Kantian: the emphasis on institutional

---

\(^1\) See, for example, Beitz, *Political Theory and International Relations*.

\(^2\) See, for example, Pogge, *Realizing Rawls*.

\(^3\) See, Rawls, *The Law of Peoples*, where he famously – and, for many, disappointingly – rejects the first strand of thinking on the problem of global distributive inequality.
rather than redistributive justice leads to something like the contemporary equivalent of
Kant’s *foedus pacificum* – an association of distinct, internally just political communities.

Can both positions – that is, a robust cosmopolitanism committed to the well-being of every member of the global human community and a quasi-nationalist approach focussed on the particular institutions of particular political societies – be regarded as genuinely Kantian? If so, what does that tell us about Kant’s thinking on the dual problems of international relations and international justice? What follows is an attempt to isolate both ways of thinking in Kant’s moral and political thought. Here, then, are the essential questions that must be examined: What is the relationship between Kant’s moral philosophy and his political prescriptions? Are the latter the natural outgrowth of the former? If so, do our prevailing political institutions live up to the duties prescribed by the moral imperative? If not, which is exactly what we shall find to be the case, what is the mediating force between the moral and the political? This last question in particular will be our focus: the central claim of the present work is that the Kantian political agent is *not* the ideal moral agent – indeed, is fundamentally incapable, in light of his nature, of translating the moral imperatives into political institutions – and that as a result Kant’s political philosophy is characterized by the impossibility of its realization. What we get in Kant’s political writings, then, is a second-best alternative: the pacific federation he prescribes is the only solution available to phenomenal beings, whose connection to their arbitrary associations negates the possibility of the *true* Kantian ideal, the global commonwealth of ends. What we shall ultimately find – and, as the title indicates, this is to be regarded as a shortcoming of Kant’s approach – is that the conflict between our universal and particular inclinations is an irresolvable one. To be, simultaneously, a moral and phenomenal being – that is, to be subject to the categorical imperative and to live as a member of a particular social matrix, characterized by the peculiar mindset cultivated among its members – is to lead a kind of double inner life.

We can see this dualism between the moral – or, noumenal – and the phenomenal begin to play itself out in Kant’s account of the emergence of the domestic social contract. In his *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose*, he writes:

“[t]he means which nature employs to bring about the development of innate capacities is that of antagonism within society, insofar as this antagonism becomes the cause of a law-governed social order. By antagonism, I mean the unsocial sociability of men […] the desire for honour, power or property, it drives him to seek status from his fellows […] Without these desires, all man’s
excellent natural capacities would never be roused to develop.”

On this account, competition for property and power leads to the need for, and eventual emergence of, external laws designed to prevent mutual destruction. The imposition of positive law, says Kant, has a restraining effect on our natural desires, and eventually leads to a condition of “freedom under external laws.” Living within this legal culture of enforced self-discipline also has an awakening effect on the moral sentiments: it is only within a moderately well-ordered community, characterized by its publicly known positive law, that internal self-discipline – that is, genuine, self-directed adherence to the dictates of the categorical imperative – can emerge. And this is precisely the ideal meaning of empirical history, which is, for Kant, hardly a purposeless string of events:

“Nature has willed that man should produce entirely by his own initiative everything which goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence, and that he should not partake of any other happiness or perfection than that which he has procured for himself without instinct and by his own reason.”

As history progresses, says Kant, we come to an awareness of ourselves as beings in possession of a free will – a will capable of transcending the limitations of biology – and an intellect uniquely capable of ordering the world around us. The human being, on this account, is the only rational animal and is, by extension, duty-bound to develop his rationality to its fullest potential. What, exactly, does it mean for Kant to be fully rational? What does our status as noumenal beings entail? Here, there is an intimate connection between freedom and reason: to be fully rational, on Kant’s account, is to find one’s freedom in the fulfillment of the duty to obey nothing other than our own moral reason. What counts as sound moral reasoning, then? Actions, says Kant, are morally sound when condoned by the meta-rule for individual judgements: the categorical imperative. And despite its multiple formulations, all versions of the categorical imperative share a single presupposition: all moral action must be motivated by a good

---

4 Kant, *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose*, p. 44.
5 Ibid., p. 45. See also Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, p. 112.
6 Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, p. 112.
7 Kant, *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose*, p. 43. See also Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, p. 108.
9 Kant, *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose*, p. 42. See also Kant, *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone*, p. 97.
will, one that respects the autonomy of other wills.¹⁰ In this way, morally acceptable principles are those that can be consistently universalized; they can serve as laws for all people at all times. Ultimately, the widespread capacity to recognize and adhere to the dictates of the categorical imperative is the fundamental purpose of history. Indeed, for Kant, history is nothing less than the proliferation of reason in the world:

“Individual men little imagine that, while they are pursuing their own ends, each in his own way and often in opposition to others, they are unwittingly guided in their advance along a course intended by nature.”¹¹

And although we eventually come to recognize this ideal conception of history as an outgrowth of empirical history – that is, the outcome of empirical history is an internal moral order capable of ordering the actions of agents – Kant maintains that the two can never converge. The internal moral order of the categorical imperative, he says, is not universally compelling:

“If he lives among others of his own species, man is also an animal who needs a master. For he certainly abuses his freedom in relation to others of his own kind. And even although, as a rational creature, he desires a law to impose limits on the freedom of all, he is still misled by his self-seeking animal inclinations into exempting himself from the law where he can.”¹²

Despite our status as noumenal beings, then, we simultaneously remain natural beings, governed by natural causality and in possession of biological needs that require satisfaction.¹³ In this way, the contradiction between the phenomenal and the noumenal maps on to the irreconcilability of empirical and ideal history.

What might such a resolution, however impossible, look like? It is described by Kant as the “universal kingdom of ends”: a purely noumenal order in which a spontaneous totality of autonomously adopted ends is created out of a multitude of individual wills, all of which are determined by universal principles of reason.¹⁴ Such an association can be narrowly construed as the realm of perfect negative freedom: in a political association populated exclusively by good wills – wills whose primary interest is respecting the autonomy of others – the dictates of conscience are seamlessly translated into publicly promulgated positive law. In his **Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic**

---

¹⁰ Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, §1.
¹¹ Kant, *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose*, p. 41. See also Kant, *Theory and Practice*, p. 88 – 89.
¹² Ibid., p. 46.
¹³ Ibid., p.41.
¹⁴ See, for example, Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, §128 - §133.
of Morals, Kant writes:

“By a kingdom I understand the union of different rational beings in a system by common laws. Now since it is by laws that ends are determined as regards their universal validity, hence, if we abstract from the personal differences of rational beings and likewise from all the content of their private ends, we shall be able to conceive all ends combined in a systematic whole, that is to say, we can conceive a kingdom of ends […] Hence results a systematic union of rational being by common objective laws, i.e., a kingdom which may be called a kingdom of ends, since what these laws have in view is just the relation of these beings to one another as ends.”

The kingdom of ends is thus characterized by its universality: we realize our true selves, says Kant, only when we act from the moral law. Here, Kant broaches the possibility of mutually compatible moral decisions: out of distinct parts – each of which is simply pursuing its own self-chosen ends, but also remains capable of recognizing the ends of others – arises a meaningful whole. With regards to the robust cosmopolitan’s use of Kant’s moral philosophy, however, the purely negative model of freedom is insufficient.

Of course, Kant’s moral philosophy is characterized by the centrality of duty: we are, he says, duty-bound by the universalist dictates of the categorical imperative. And by extension, adherence to the moral law seems to be the only legitimate motivation for action. A closer look at Kant’s writings, however, reveals a more robust account of duty: individual moral agents are not only obligated to refrain from harming others – narrowly conceived, this is what it means to treat others as ends not as means – we are also responsible for actively pursuing the kingdom of ends. Indeed, in the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant regards the happiness of others as an obligatory or “objective” end.16 Says Moore:

“To treat others as “ends” involves actively respecting them, taking their autonomy and well-being as ends or values for us. Kant tells us that part of treating others as ends is making their ends our own, and taking into account their happiness […] the highest good is always a social good.”

This is precisely the blueprint for the first cosmopolitan strand of thinking on international relations: to be moral is precisely to strive for an order in which all members are genuinely treated as ends. On this account, global interdependence gives rise to the possibility of a global kingdom of ends, with all of the distributive modifications this entails. Hence the contemporary cosmopolitan’s appropriation of Kant’s moral

---

15 Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysic of Morals, §2.
16 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, p. 385. See also Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, p. 97.
17 Moore, “Kant’s ethical community,” p. 55.
philosophy. The problem, however, is that Kant tells us that such a political scheme is simply impossible: “It is,” he says in the *Groundwork*, “certainly only an ideal.”\(^{18}\) Again, and more explicitly, in the *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose*:

> “[The kingdom of ends] is the most difficult of all tasks, and a perfect solution is impossible. Nothing straight can be constructed from such warped wood as that which man is made of. Nature only requires that we should approximate to this idea.”\(^{19}\)

As natural beings, then, we will always have needs and passions that thwart our moral perfection – the outward sign of which is the genuine capacity to treat others as ends and not means – though we are dimly aware of what such perfection might look like in practice. Simply put, we tend towards particularity – that is, an added emphasis on our own interests – not universality, and this claim will take on added relevance in our discussion of perpetual peace below. While ideal Kantian agents would spontaneously do what ought to be done, for us compliance with the categorical imperative remains a duty, which is often disregarded. The kingdom of ends, whether in the domestic or cosmopolitan realm, therefore remains a utopia, an ideal to which all reasoning beings must aspire, despite the knowledge that attaining it is simply impossible.\(^{20}\) All of this accounts for Kant’s discussion of the domestic social contract not as an historical event, but as a regulative ideal: because our ideal moral sentiments cannot be translated into the perfect political constitution, we must regard the social contract as a “basic postulate of reason” – a rational principle we use for judging the lawfulness, and therefore legitimacy, of any existing political constitution.\(^{21}\) The social contract, then, is the principle of a rational constitution, just as the categorical imperative is the principle that forms the particular maxims of individuals.

The above considerations must give the contemporary Kantian pause: robust cosmopolitanism, which is Kantian in its emphasis on the individual’s capacity for and

---

\(^{18}\) Kant, *Groundwork for the Metaphysic of Morals*, §2.

\(^{19}\) Kant, *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose*, p. 46.

\(^{20}\) For Kant, this is the ultimate act of faith: we must, that is, have faith in God as the lawgiver of the genuine kingdom of ends. See, for example, Kant, *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone*, p. 408: “There must [...] be someone other than the populace capable of beings specified as the public lawgiver for an ethical commonwealth [...] this is the concept of God as moral ruler of the world. Hence an ethical commonwealth can be thought of only possible as a people under divine commands, i.e., as a people of God, and indeed under laws of virtue.” On this account, reasoning beings can only will their own moral perfection if they have faith that such perfection is actually possible. See also, Kant, *Theory and Practice*, p. 90 – 91 and *Perpetual Peace*, 108 - 109.

\(^{21}\) Kant, *Theory and Practice*, p. 83.
right to self-determination, is clearly compromised by the dualism that ultimately characterizes Kant’s moral philosophy. On that account, to be human is to be a flawed moral agent; indeed, our nature is such that the categorical imperative becomes appreciably less compelling as the scope of our duties is widened: if a perfectly just domestic social contract is impossible, so too must be the far-reaching global society associated with the first strand of Kantian cosmopolitanism.\footnote{See Kant, \textit{Perpetual Peace}, p. 107 – 108. \hspace{1em} In his discussion of injustices committed against inhabitants of far off places, Kant’s language is telling: “The peoples of the earth have entered in varying degrees into a universal community, and it has developed to the point where a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere.” No corresponding action is implied, which again corresponds to the moral-phenomenal dualism.} Ultimately the implications of this dualism are two-fold: any solution for a problem as pressing as global justice must first be characterized by a realistic likelihood of implementation and, second, fully in line with the moral sentiments of the agents responsible for implementing such a change. As we have seen, robust cosmopolitanism fails on both these accounts: particularity, says Kant, tends to trump the universal concerns of humanity. What then is the alternative to the global kingdom of ends? One potential response places an emphasis not on the self-determination of individuals, but on the self-determination of states. As mentioned above, this second strand is closely associated with Kant’s pacific federation: a union of internally just (i.e. republican) states, each of which is capable of recognizing the sovereignty of other similarly constituted states.\footnote{See, for example, Kant, \textit{Perpetual Peace}, p. 96: “No state shall forcibly interfere in the constitution and government of another state.”} Let us closely examine Kant’s depiction of this federation, with the ultimate intention of questioning its appeal. What we shall ultimately find is that, like his account of domestic peace, Kant’s vision of international relations is characterized by a longing for the impossible and, in this particular case, by the substitution of an ultimately unattractive vision of perpetual peace.

Just as individuals have the categorical duty to pursue a rational constitution – and thus to escape the aforementioned antagonism of civil society – so too do states have the same responsibility to avoid the death and destruction associated with international warfare. There is, says Kant, an obvious solution to the lawlessness of the international state of nature:

“There is only one rational way in which states coexisting with other states can emerge from the lawless condition of pure warfare. They must renounce their savage and lawless freedom, adapt themselves to public coercive laws, and thus form an \textit{international state} (civitas gentium), which
If Kant had stopped there, we could confidently say something like this: the international relations theory grows organically out of the moral theory, ideally understood. To be a moral being, which states are, is to be deserving of certain rights, and this status is institutionalized through the creation of the *civitas gentium*. Kant also regards cosmopolitan rights – owed, of course, to all human beings *qua* human beings – as the “necessary complement” to the creation of the international state, which will bring its members towards an awareness of the “universal right of humanity.”

Unsurprisingly, though, especially in light of our previous discussion of the dualism running through Kant’s thought, he continues:

“But since this is not the will of the nations, according to their present conception of international right, the positive idea of a *world republic* cannot be realised. If all is not to be lost, this can at best find a negative substitute in the shape of an enduring and gradually expanding *federation* likely to prevent war.”

In an ideal world, then, sovereign states are not only able to recognize the folly of warfare but, more importantly, are capable of transcending the superficial differences between themselves and, in turn, creating something resembling the global kingdom of ends. This, however, is not their will. Why not, though the answer should already be clear? What exactly are the “superficial” differences that prevent the creation of the world republic? How are they to be understood?

Kant identifies two such marks of particularity: language and religion. While Kant dismisses the possibility of meaningful religious differences – a clever and devastating footnote, indeed – language, and by extension culture, are genuine barriers to the “intermingling” of nations and in turn, “occasion mutual hatred and provide pretexts

---


25 See, for example, Ibid., p. 94: “Like a tree, it has its own roots, and to graft it on to another state as if it were a shoot is to terminate its existence as a moral personality and make it into a commodity.”

26 Ibid., p. 108. See also Ibid., p. 89: “A constitution based on cosmopolitan right, is so far as individuals and states, coexisting in an external relationship of mutual influences, may be regarded as citizens of a universal state of mankind. This classification, with respect to the idea of perpetual peace, is not arbitrary, but necessary.”

27 Ibid., p. 105.

28 We must quickly note an important, highly relevant distinction in Kant’s thought: that is, the fundamental difference between a universal monarchy, which Kant rejects as a “soulless despotism,” and the global kingdom of ends. While the former is “an amalgamation of the separate nations under a single power which has overruled the rest,” the latter is governed by a properly constituted republican constitution, which, as we have already seen, is the natural outgrowth of the moral sentiments of ideal Kantian agents. See Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, p. 113.
for wars.” Kant’s second account of cultural particularity is equally troubling. Here, linguistic and cultural particularity are regarded as a kind of trick played on us by nature:

“Nature wisely separates the nations, although the will of each individual state, even basing its argument on international right, would gladly unite them under its own sway by force or by cunning […] And unlike that universal despotism which saps all man’s energies and ends in a graveyard of freedom, this peace is created and guaranteed by an equilibrium of forces.”

29 Kant, Perpetual Peace, p. 114.
30 Note that neither account is willing to concede the intrinsic significance of communal membership. Recall, here, that the only legitimate political community – the kingdom of ends – is one whose members act only according to the dictates of the categorical imperative i.e. according to principles characterized by their universality. There is no room, on this account, for privileging one’s compatriots or for regarding their plight as more compelling than that of a complete stranger. According to the present work, this is to be regarded as a serious flaw in Kant’s political theory.
31 Ibid., p. 114.
32 Kant, Perpetual Peace, p. 114.
As we have already seen in the domestic case, peace for Kant is always the result of social antagonism. And like the domestic case, where our phenomenal needs obscure our proper moral sentiments, so too in the international realm do our superficial needs lead to mutual destructiveness. For Kant, though, this is simply part of nature’s plan. While our attachment to a particular culture or set of political institutions may feel as though it has some kind of intrinsically meaningful significance, the reality, says Kant, is that cultural particularity is simply the means towards an historical telos, which in this case is a rational, and therefore lasting, peace. In spite of the intentions or desires of moral agents, then, the machinations of nature work in such a way as to guarantee the proliferation of reason. And so despite our general moral incompetence – this should recall the first reading of national particularity – Kant can still maintain that perpetual peace is possible precisely because it is nature’s will:

“How does nature guarantee that what man ought to do by the laws of freedom (but does not do) will in fact be done through nature’s compulsion? [...] For I say that nature wills that this or that should happen, this does not mean that nature imposes on us a duty to do it, for duties can only be imposed by practical reason, acting without internal constraint. On the contrary, nature does it herself, whether we are willing or not.”

In the end then, Kant regards perpetual peace not as the result of human agency – which, as we have seen, is fundamentally flawed – but as a result of the will of a benevolent deity. And any account that places so much emphasis on unknowable, mysterious forces has to be regarded as an unsatisfactory foundation for any theory of just international relations.

By way of conclusion, let us quickly look at Hegel, a thinker expressly motivated by the shortcomings of Kant’s moral and political philosophy. Indeed, for advocates of the second strand of thought outlined above, which focuses not on the well-being of individuals but on the internal justice of particular societies, Hegel is an appealing figure precisely because he recognizes the genuine moral significance of shared political institutions. Consider this fundamental difference: while freedom for Kant is transcendental – that is, our ethical duties, i.e. the source of our freedom, transcend our particular circumstances and desires – Hegel’s notion of freedom, and of ethical life, is distinctively institutional. Freedom on this account is not realized by adhering to the

---

33Ibid., p. 112.
objective (i.e. transcendental) moral law without compulsion, but is instead realized in the social world through political and social institutions at a particular historical moment. In fact, it is only within a rational social world – that is, one whose institutional composition is conducive to the exercise of freedom – that we can live lives that are fully rational and good:

“When a father asked him for advice about the best way of educating his son in ethical matters, a Pythagorean replied: ‘Make him the citizen of a state with good laws.’”

This must be understood as a response to Kant, who, in light of his moral philosophical assumptions, is committed to the belief that, once a basic minimum level of institutional progress has been accomplished, all persons have an equal chance to attain moral freedom regardless of any – indeed, the inevitable – prevailing injustices. Hegel, by contrast, is committed to the view that our “moral compass” is the product of the rational institutions and customs of our social world, which have become a deeply ingrained part of us as we develop. Indeed, Hegel regards our attachment to a particular set of institutions as the meaningful culmination of a long historical process. And in our reflective moments, he says, we come to recognize the socio-political institutions of the state as the source of our freedom:

“Right is something utterly sacred, for the simple reason that it is the existence of the absolute concept, of self-conscious freedom.”

Civil society, for example, shows us that our freedom (i.e. our status as rights-bearing citizens) is the product of political institutions (i.e. the market, property rights, etc.) rather than adherence to the transcendental moral law. And this is a crucial moment in Hegel’s system: the ideal modern state cannot be made fully actual, he says, until its citizens understand how and why it conduces to their freedom.

All of this, it seems to me, is a considerably more sound – and certainly more attractive – foundation for the kind of pacific federation eventually endorsed by Kant. Rather than being regarded as a regrettable alternative to the global commonwealth of ends, a Hegelian account recognizes – and regards as vitally important – the emotional

---

34 Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, §153.
36 Ibid., §30. See also Ibid., §185R and §260.
37 See, for example, Ibid., §46.
38 See, for example, Ibid., §260 (H, G): “[T]he universality of the end cannot make further progress without the personal knowledge and volition of the particular individuals.”
attachment of citizens to a particular set of institutions. And not only that: it also regards as centrally important the process of institutional creation, revision and maintenance. This, according to the Hegelian account, is the centrepiece of a particular people’s political history and is thus a legitimate source of national pride. To be in possession of just institutions – ones that guarantee an acceptable standard of living for all citizens – is a significant political accomplishment. And a central tenet of the institutional cosmopolitanism being proposed here – one that is highly indebted to Rawls’s vision – is that, while individual citizens will have difficulty conceptualizing, and being moved by, the hardships suffered by distant individuals, the collective desire for institutional self-determination is easily recognized in other peoples. While this process in burdened countries may require the aid of other more advantageously situated peoples, the idea of a strict cut-off point once just institutions are operational is an essential component of this strand of institutional cosmopolitanism: the constant, unending redistribution of robust cosmopolitanism doesn’t make sense within a framework committed to the self-determination of peoples.  

The present work has tried to call into question the use of Kant’s moral and political philosophy as a theoretical foundation for issues of global distributive justice. It has been exposed as having questionable value for two prominent strands of thought: first, what I have called robust cosmopolitanism, which employs the individual as its unit of measure and, second, institutional cosmopolitanism, which is characterized by its commitment to reforming the distributive institutions of a particular society rather than adjusting the resources distributed to the individuals within it. The goal of the first strand is individual well-being, however specified, while the second strand focuses on ensuring that domestic distributive institutions produce just outcomes, however specified. The essential claims of the paper can be summarised as follows: the assumptions of Kant’s moral philosophy regard the central goal of robust cosmopolitanism as simply impossible. Human nature is such that phenomenal concerns tend to trump our willingness to adhere to the universalist dictates of the categorical imperative. This

---

39 It is worth noting, here, the important connection between self-determination and a people’s self-respect. Indeed, a people’s desire for self-respect – and for recognition by other peoples – is a central assumption of this strand of institutional cosmopolitanism. It is also related, in an important way, to the stability of a federation of peoples based on a condition of mutual recognition.
dualism, as I have argued, is a central, undeniable aspect of Kant’s moral and political philosophy and clearly problematizes robust cosmopolitanism’s appropriation of Kantian moral and political philosophy. The second, institutional stream certainly shares the same conclusion as Kant, but approaches the problem of international relations from a fundamentally different viewpoint, based on fundamentally different assumptions. Whereas Kant regards national and cultural particularity as either (a) a moral defect or (b) an instrumental aspect of a wider historical phenomenon, the institutional cosmopolitan views the individual’s connection to a particular set on institutions – and, therefore, to a very specific pattern of historical experience – as possessing intrinsic significance. Kant’s justification for the pacific federation is therefore irreconcilable with that of institutional cosmopolitanism proposed here. Instead, particularity, when properly constituted, is regarded as both meaningful and as the essential foundation of perpetual peace and, by extension, of effective economic redistribution.

**Works Cited**


